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Abstract
The rst part of this dissertation evaluates the impact of a large and territorially concen-
trated foreign direct investment (FDI) inow on local labor market outcomes in the Czech
Republic. A di¤erence-in-di¤erences technique is employed for estimating the impact of
a joint investment of Toyota and Peugeot on local labor market indicators. The results
indicate a positive and statistically as well as economically signicant e¤ect of a large
investment project on the local unemployment outow rate, which is driven mainly by
increases in the aggregate unemployment exit hazard rates for unemployment durations
smaller than nine months. However, the impact on long-term unemployed was negligible.
Moreover, a simple costbenet analysis suggests that investment incentives paid from a
state budget would pay o¤ only in a horizon of twelve years.
In the second chapter, I analyze the causal e¤ect of investment incentives on regional
allocation of FDI in the Czech Republic during 2001-2007. An institutional setup of
investment incentives provided foreign investors with nancial incentives depending on
the particular districts unemployment rate. The identication strategy is based on a
regression-discontinuity approach, as the schemes design introduces three unemployment
thresholds di¤erentiating the amount of the subsidy. The results indicate a positive e¤ect
of the investment scheme, but this impact is concentrated only at the lowest available
unemployment threshold. No impact at higher unemployment thresholds is found. At-
tracting FDI into the most distressed regions, therefore, remains an important challenge
for policymakers.
The last chapter provides an evaluation of the introduction of the euro on international
FDI ows. Previous empirical literature has often su¤ered from a short time span and
imperfect identication strategy. This paper analyzes the impact of the euro on FDI ows
between 35 OECD economies during 1997-2008 by adopting propensity score matching
as an identication strategy. In general, the euro exhibits no signicant impact on FDI.
However, the impact becomes signicant on a subset of EU countries. Furthermore, EU
membership fosters FDI ows much more than does the euro. Among other FDI determi-
nants, high gross domestic product, close proximity between countries, and low unit labor
costs in the target country have a positive e¤ect on FDI.
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Abstrakt
První µcást disertaµcní páce vyhodnocuje dopad rozsáhlého a geogracky koncentrovaného
pµrílivu pµrímých zahraniµcních investic (PZI) na lokální trh práce. Na pµrípadu spoleµcné
investice automobilek Toyota a Peugeot v µCeské Republice analyzuji metodou rozdíl°u v
rozdílech dopad tohoto významného projektu na ukazatele místního trhu práce. Výsledky
ukazují, µze vlivem investice vzrostla míra odlivu z nezamµestnanosti, a to zejména pro
kategorii nezamµestnaných do devíti mµesíc°u. Tyto zmµeny se následnµe projevily poklesem
okresní nezamµestnanosti a nár°ustem okresní míry zamµestnanosti. Nicménµe, pravdµepodob-
nost pµrechodu do zamµestanosti pro dlouhodobo nezamµestnané z°ustala nezmµenµená. Placebo
simulace ktivních intervencí odhalily významné podhodnocení smµerodatných chyb bµeµz-
nou metodou nejmeních µctverc°u, proto byla na výpoµcet konzistentních smµerodatných
chyb pouµzita technika block bootstrapping.
Ve druhé µcásti se vµenuji zkoumání efektu investiµcních pobídek na regionální distribuci
PZI v µCeské republice v období 2001-2007. Výe pµridµelených pobídek byla vyí v okresech
s vysokou nezamµestnaností, µcímµz systém investiµcních pobídek lákal investory zejména do
region°u nejvíce postiµzených nezamµestnaností. Identikaµcní strategie je zaloµzena na regresní
diskontinuitµe, vyuµzívající pµredem stanovená kriteria zp°usobilosti pro investiµcní pobídky.
Tyto kriteria rozdµelily okresy do µctyµr skupin v závislosti od okresní míry nezamµestnanosti.
Výsledky indikují kladný vliv investiµcních pobídek na redistribuci PZI, nicménµe jen pro
nejniµzí dostupný práh nezamµestnanosti. Dopad na vyí prahy nezamµestnanosti nebyl
potvrzen. Pµrilákání PZI do region°u nejvíce postiµzených nezamµestnaností musí být proto
doplnµeno jinými prostµredky, a stále z°ustává d°uleµzitou výzvou pro tv°urce politik trhu práce.
Tµretí µcást práce poskytuje analýzu vlivu spoleµcné evropské mµeny na pµrímé zahraniµcní
investice. Ekonometrickou analýzou 35 OECD zemí v období 1995-2008 zaloµzenou na
technice propensity score matching (párování pomocí tzv. propensity skóre) odhaduji
dopad eura na toky PZI mezi jednotlivými zemµemi. Obecnµe nebyl zjitµen kladný vliv eura
na FDI. Nicménµe, po omezení analýzy na µclenské zemµe EU se prokázal pozitivní dopad eura
na toky investic. Zajímavostí je, µze µclenství v EU vykazuje µrádovµe mnohem významnµejí
efekt na PZI neµz spoleµcná mµena. Z ostatních faktor°u mají signikantní a pozitivní vliv na
pµríliv PZI velikost ekonomik, malá vzdálenost mezi zemµemi a levná pracovní síla v cílové
ekonomice.
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Introduction
This thesis analyzes the linkages between various labor market indicators on the
one side and macroeconomic and institutional factors on the other. In particular, it
explores the role of foreign direct investment (FDI), its determinants, as well as its
impact on labor market performance. It is an empirical work, yet evaluations are
rmly based on theoretical foundations which constitute an indispensable part of all
chapters.
The rst chapter investigates the impact of a large and territorially concentrated
foreign direct investment (FDI) inow on local labor market outcomes in the Czech
Republic. A conditional di¤erence-in-di¤erences technique is employed for estimat-
ing the impact, and block bootstrapping is used for computing consistent standard
errors. The results indicate a positive and statistically, as well as economically, sig-
nicant e¤ect of a large investment project on the local unemployment outow rate,
which is driven mainly by increases in the aggregate unemployment exit hazard rates
for unemployment durations less than nine months. Subsequent to the investment,
the unemployment rate decreased by 1.7 percentage points and the employment
rate increased by 3.7 percentage points in the host district. However, the impact on
long-term unemployed was negligible as the exit hazard rates for durations longer
than nine months remain unchanged.
While the rst chapter focuses solely on the impact of FDI on local labor market
characteristics, the rest of the thesis is devoted to analyzing the main determinants
of FDI. First, a country-specic approach is adopted as the role of an investment
incentive scheme on FDI inow is evaluated. Second, an international context is
used to analyze the e¤ect of economic and monetary integration on between-country
FDI ows. In particular, the second essay estimates the causal e¤ect of the incen-
tive scheme on regional allocation of FDI in the case of the Czech Republic during
2001-2007. The incentive scheme provided foreign investors with investment incen-
tives depending on the particular districts unemployment rate. The identication
strategy is based on a regression-discontinuity approach, as the scheme design in-
troduces three unemployment thresholds di¤erentiating the amount of the subsidy.
The results indicate a positive e¤ect of the investment scheme, but this impact is
5
concentrated only at the lowest available unemployment threshold. No impact for
higher unemployment thresholds is found. Among other FDI location factors, a
share of a tertiary-educated labor force and wages have a signicant positive impact
on FDI, albeit only during 2001-2004.
The third chapter studies the e¤ect of a common currency introduction on inter-
national FDI ows. Using country-pair data on 35 economies during 1997-2008 and
the propensity score matching technique as an identication strategy, the results
indicate that the impact of the euro on FDI ows di¤ers for the full sample (OECD)
and the subsample (EU). In general, the euro exhibits no signicant impact on FDI.
However, on the subset of EU countries, the impact becomes signicant, increasing
FDI ows by 14.3 to 42.5 percent. Furthermore, being in the EU contributes to FDI
ows much more than does the euro, increasing FDI ows by 55 to 166 percent.
Among other FDI determinants, high gross domestic product, close proximity be-
tween countries and low unit labor costs in the target country have a positive e¤ect
on FDI, while long-term exchange rate volatility decreases FDI ows.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of Territorially
Concentrated FDI on Local Labor
Markets: Evidence from the Czech
Republic
(Joint work with Daniel Munich)
1.1 Introduction
Improving labor market outcomes is a key goal for most policymakers, and for many
economies attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is viewed as an important tool
to improve local labor market conditions. After the collapse of communism, the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have experienced a transition towards
a market economy. This process involved a huge inow of foreign investment,1 either
due to a comparative advantage in low-skill and physical capital-intensive sectors or
as a result of the privatization of banks and state-owned enterprises.
The main goal of this paper is to assess the impact of a large, territorially con-
centrated FDI inow on local labor market outcomes, using the largest investment
project in the Czech Republic during 1993-2006, the Toyota-Peugeot-Citroën joint
This work has been previously published in Labour Economics 17 (2010), [pages 354-367].
All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the author.
1The majority of investors have come from Western Europe, although the FDI inow from Asia
has become more prominent especially after 2000 (Woon, 2003). FDI in CEECs has contributed
to steady economic growth in this region since 1995 (see Table 1.1).
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investment into the automobile sector in Kolín, the Czech Republic. This project is
used to quantify the e¤ect of FDI on district unemployment outow and inow rates,
aggregate unemployment exit hazard rates, and, consequently, both the unemploy-
ment and employment rates. Central and Eastern Europe is especially appropriate
for such an analysis as there was a lack of FDI under the centrally-planned system
up to 1989, and since 1989 it has experienced several huge greeneld investment
projects. For policymaking purposes, it is crucial that the impact of such large
projects is analyzed rigorously and this study focuses on one of the largest realized
projects in the CEEC region. The most appropriate econometric techniques are
used, ensuring that estimates are consistent and standard errors are not underesti-
mated.
The motivation for this study is threefold. First, countries promote FDI inow
using various policy incentives - either direct (nancial subsidies) or indirect (such
as building infrastructure). These incentives require signicant government spend-
ing,2 raising questions about the e¢ ciency of such schemes. A rigorous analysis of
FDI e¤ects is necessary for a correct assessment of the e¢ ciency of governmental
investment policies.3 In other words, it remains an open question whether the real
benets arising from an investment project in a particular region outweigh the cost
of the subsidies for the state budget.4 FDI subsidies are usually scaled according to
the target region. Governments assume the e¤ect of FDI inow on the local econ-
omy is economically signicant and thus, rms that invest in regions with higher
unemployment rates are preferred and receive more favorable treatment (a higher
2Complementary and more general strategies focus on adopting quality legislation, eliminating
trade barriers and improving the business environment, law enforcement, labor force skills and
infrastructure (Oman, 2000).
3Governments view these subsidies as a crucial instrument in boosting employment, creating
new job opportunities, accelerating economic growth and enhancing competitiveness (Rondinelli
and Burpitt, 2000). Indeed, many multinational companies have made their allocation decisions
not only based on the high potential of CEECs but also based on policy-driven factors such as the
investment subsidies provided by host countries (Demekas et al., 2005).
4Especially in the case of huge greeneld investments, rms have been so aggressive in seeking
subsidies that countries have engaged in a race to the bottom, where foreign rms end up with
such generous nancial subsidies that it seems unprotable for countries to host the investment.
Government may end up su¤ering from the winners curse, as that term is used in auction theory.
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level of nancial incentives). From a social standpoint, this regional di¤erentiation
is justied only if concentrated FDI inow substantially improves local labor market
outcomes.
Second, while there seems to be a great deal of literature concerning the e¤ects
of FDI on rm performance, there are few studies analyzing the impact of large
FDI inows on local labor markets. Studies have focused on the implication of FDI
on the productivity of domestic rms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 2004)
and on regional development (Harris and Taylor, 2005) but there is limited research
evaluating the impact of investment on local labor market outcomes (Mickiewicz et
al., 2000). Third, the automobile investment project in Kolín was quite unique in its
scale and therefore it provides a good opportunity to accurately evaluate the impact
of a large one-o¤ project.
The average e¤ect of the investment project on the local labor market is esti-
mated using matching techniques. The idea is to match a treated district with oth-
erwise similar districts that did not undergo a large FDI inow so that labor market
dynamics can be compared to a counterfactual state for the treated district. We
employ the method of propensity score matching as introduced by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) and the identication strategy is based on a conditional di¤erence-
in-di¤erences estimation, following Heckman et al. (1997). The ndings suggest
that the one-o¤ investment project has a statistically signicant and economically
sizeable impact on the unemployment rate and the employment rate, driven by an
increase in short-term unemployed exit hazard rates.
1.2 Survey of the literature
Most literature analyzing FDI e¤ects on a host country concentrates on technology
spillovers to domestic rms. This paper focuses instead on the channels through
which FDI a¤ects employment. These channels work directly through creating jobs
in new rms or indirectly through spillover e¤ects (transferring technology and im-
9
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proving the e¢ ciency of complementary or competing rms, leading to changes in
labor force demand), crowding-out e¤ects and distributional e¤ects.
The direct e¤ect on the employment rate is straightforward the new investment
project requires a labor force and new hirings positively a¤ect local employment
and unemployment rates. The e¤ect of technology spillovers occurs in two forms:
horizontal and vertical. Horizontal spillovers occur when domestic rms improve
their e¢ ciency due to the presence of the foreign company through linkages such
as spreading knowledge and sharing trained personnel. Vertical spillovers result
from the inuences of the foreign company on domestic customers and suppliers
(e.g. Dunning, 1993a). These linkages can lead to improved e¢ ciency in production
processes and subsequently to changes in the demand for labor. Moreover, the labor
market can be a¤ected by a crowding-out e¤ect. This occurs when inward FDI
leads to a displacement of regular workers (some workers quit their previous job in
order to start a new one) and new employment opportunities arise at the cost of
an employment decrease in established enterprises. This process a¤ects the wage
distribution. Wage inequality may increase if skilled workers are especially valuable
to foreign companies (Tomohara and Yokota, 2007).
In addition, concentrated FDI inow creates a potential danger of excessive de-
pendence and vulnerability of the local labor market to one source of employment,
which can result in massive layo¤s of the labor force in the case of industry-specic
adverse demand shocks. Other negative e¤ects occur in the form of the opportu-
nity costs of FDI incentives: instead of providing foreign investors with a subsidy,
nancial resources might have been used for other projects (e.g. active labor market
policies, retraining courses, etc.). The total indirect employment e¤ect can, there-
fore, be either positive or negative and, in some cases, outweigh the positive direct
e¤ect, giving an unclear ex-ante total net e¤ect. Overall, the relationship between
FDI and employment is inuenced by di¤erent macro and micro factors, making a
comprehensive assessment di¢ cult.
Studies focusing on the recent automobile industry boom in Central Europe are
10
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mostly descriptive. Sadler and Swain (1994) analyze the state of the automotive
industry in CEECs after 1989 and describe changes in the structure and allocation
of investments resulting from the quest of foreign investors for new markets and
low-cost production. Before the investors inux into this region, the automotive
industry in CEECs was under-developed and technologically outdated (Havas, 2000).
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, however, possessed great potential for
growth and development due to the skilled but cheap labor force and a substantial
and steady rise in car demand (Van Tulder and Ruigrok, 1998). None of these
studies, however, concentrates on the consequences of FDI and its impact on regional
development or labor market dynamics.
Considering the literature assessing the e¤ects of FDI, there are numerous stud-
ies on FDIs impact on poverty levels and inequality. This literature can be divided
into two strands: cross-country studies and within-country studies. Cross-country
studies analyze the e¤ect of FDI on growth rates or inequality, while country case
studies typically examine the impact of FDI on regional or district-level outcomes.
Cross-country studies take advantage of a comparison among several countries and,
thus, allow a generalization beyond one specic case study. However, obtaining suf-
cient data may be di¢ cult for more countries and a lack of observations may yield
inconclusive results. Moreover, it can be problematic to measure factors a¤ecting
country trade policy, or to approximate other changes occurring in individual coun-
tries. Overall, there is no unequivocal evidence that globalization and increased
FDI inow is benecial for the poor as empirical literature yields ambiguous re-
sults.5 Within-country studies analyze the e¤ectiveness of a governments regional
strategies and their impact on the local labor market. In a US study, Greenstone et
al. (2008) identify the agglomeration spillovers of a large new manufacturing plant
opening and estimate that the plant opening increases the total factor productivity
of incumbent plants in the same county by 12 percent. Runner-up counties are used
as counterfactuals and di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation is adopted.
5For a summary of FDIs impact on poverty and income inequality, see Harrison (2006).
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The empirical literature analyzing the employment e¤ects of FDI is less frequent
and o¤ers mixed results. Dunning (1993b) examines the impact of both inward and
outward direct investment on employment and asserts that whereas there exists sig-
nicant e¤ects on industry structure and productivity, the employment rate remains
una¤ected. Similarly, Ramirez (2002) shows in his study of the Mexican labor mar-
ket that the contribution of the automobile industry to long-term local employment
creation has been limited since most of the transferred technology had an impact
on capital-intensive manufacturing. On the contrary, Mickiewicz et al. (2000) in
their analysis of the role of FDI in the restructuring of the CEEC economies nd
evidence that FDI operates as an important bu¤er to negative employment shocks
and contributes to local employment generation. This process serves, however, only
as a complement to domestically generated employment rather than its substitute.
According to Benacek and Visek (2001), in the case of the Czech Republic, foreign
investment has played an important role during the transition period and foreign
capital became the engine of growth for the economy. This growth occurred
mainly due to the stabilization and restructuring of the economy with FDI incentive
schemes being a relatively unimportant factor.
Hale and Long (2006) show that the presence of FDI ignites a wage increase in
privately owned domestic and foreign rms, potentially through productivity growth
caused by knowledge and technology transfer. However, the analysis of the impact of
the plants opening on wages is not an objective of this study as the wage pressures
initiated by the FDI inow that determine unemployment dynamics are already
reected in the aggregate net e¤ect on labor market outcomes. Moreover, due to a
methodology change in 2002 there are inconsistencies in the reporting of wages.6
The focus of this paper is to examine the impact of a one-o¤, large and concen-
6The Czech Statistical O¢ ce changed the methodology for reporting wages in 2002 from a
plantmethod to an enterprisemethod, integrating all rm branches into the district where a
rms head o¢ ce is located, thus distorting the picture of wage distribution across districts, which
makes an unbiased wage analysis impossible. Using data information prior to this break, Galuscak
and Munich (2005) estimate a time-varying wage curve in the Czech Republic and nd that the
elasticity of local wages wih respect to regional unemployment is approximately -0.1, a value in line
with previous empirical literature analyzing the relationship between wages and unemployment in
European countries (Blanchower and Oswald, 1994).
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trated investment project on local outcomes such as employment generation, exit
hazard rates, etc. The region of Central and Eastern Europe is especially appropri-
ate for such an analysis as there was a lack of FDI before 1989 and the region has
experienced several huge greeneld investment projects since then.7 The subject of
this study is one of the largest realized projects in the region - an investment in the
automotive industry in Central Bohemia.
1.3 Background information
1.3.1 The TPCA investment
In December 2001, PSA Peugeot Citroën and Toyota Motor Corporation8 announced
a plan to establish a new automobile plant in the Czech Republic in the industrial
zone Kolín-Ovµcáry (located in the Central Bohemia region). The Czech government
passed a resolution where it committed to nancing preparation work on the lo-
cation. In March 2002, the joint company was legally established under the name
Toyota Peugeot Citroën Automobile (TPCA) and preparation work on the greeneld
site started. Shortly afterwards, a contract between TPCA and the municipality of
Kolín was signed, specifying the road map of the investment project. In September
2002, the 125 hectare site was ready for use and the construction of the plant be-
gan. During preparation and construction, 350 construction workers were employed
on the site. Additional employment was created at the beginning of 2003 when
hiring for the plant started. By March 2004, TPCA had already hired 500 people
and by October 2004 already 1,000 manufacturing workers had been employed. In
7A majority of these investment projects have been aimed at the manufacturing sector, mostly
the automotive industry.
8Toyota is the third largest car producer in the world and by far the largest in Japan. Strong
on the domestic market, and present in Western Europe through numerous subsidiaries, Toyota
lagged behind in founding branches in Central and Eastern Europe. Only after 1999 did it decide
to invest in this region and use the advantages of the qualied and cheap labor force (Woon, 2003).
In July 2001, Toyota signed a contract with PSA Peugeot Citroen about committing to the joint
development of a new car and establishing a new production plant. PSA Peugeot Citroen is one of
the top European car producers, especially in the production of diesel engines. The two companies
divided the responsibilities: Toyota is in charge of production, and PSA Peugeot Citroën is in
charge of marketing.
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mid-November 2004, 1,650 workers were employed at TPCA and in December 2004
permission for trial operation was issued by the municipality of Kolín.
Most new employees (including workers from other parts of the Czech Republic)
joined TPCA in February and March 2005. This corresponds with the start of
production, which occurred on February 28th, 2005. Hiring (as part of setting up
the plant) nished in September 2005 and at that time 3,000 employees worked for
TPCA, out of whom 2,000 were blue-collar workers. In mid-2007, the employment
level achieved a steady state and the plant had stabilized the number of its employees
at 3,500, out of whom 2,600 were blue-collar workers.9
Apart from hiring workers in the Kolín district or the Central Bohemia region, the
company also searched for new employees in other regions of the Czech Republic.10
As a result, more than half of the workforce came from outside the Kolín district.
In the rst months after the start of production, the turnover remained high mainly
because of the delayed construction of new ats (only 136 ats out of 850 had
been built on time). According to TPCA, each month about 50-60 workers left the
company due to inadequate housing conditions.
The overall volume of the investment in the Czech Republic (including start-
up costs and research and development) reported by the TPCA upon ling the
application for investment incentives was 23.5 billion CZK (700 million Euro) and
represents the largest single greeneld investment in the Czech Republic from 1993
to 2007.11 The investment incentive for TPCA reached 1.78 billion CZK, amounting
to more than 40 percent of the total nancial incentives awarded during 1998-2004
9The number of registered unemployed and the overall labor force in the district was 4,400 and
45,000, respectively, as of the announcement of the investment.
10Before the end of 2002, the Czech government announced it would build 850 ats for future
TPCA workers in Kolín. The expenses would be borne by the Czech government and the munici-
pality of Kolín. In late 2004, TPCA started a hiring campaign in Northern Bohemia, particularly
in the district Mostecko where the unemployment rate was as high as 25 percent. Between Novem-
ber 1, 2004 and January 12, 2005, TPCA also organized a massive hiring campaign in Northern
Moravia. The main aim of these campaigns was to attract a potential work force willing to move
and work in the Kolín plant. Almost 3,000 people expressed interest; according to TPCA, half
of them went to the rst round of interviews and 712 candidates qualied for the second round.
Eventually, more than half of these joined the company.
11The data source is the government agency CzechInvest, which was established for FDI pro-
motion. Considering GDP in 2003, the planned investment reached 0.755% of yearly GDP.
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in the Czech Republic.12 For a better illustration of the size of the investment and
its regional impact, Table 1.2 presents the size and the share of supported FDI in the
overall magnitude of FDI. Two main characteristics can be observed: rst, excluding
Prague, a vast majority of investment inow is supported by the state; second, the
investment project reported by TPCA exceeds the realized FDI increase in Kolín.
This discrepancy can be attributed to the lag in the realization of investment plans or
to inaccurate estimation by the company prior to the realization of the investment.
Nevertheless, the TPCA plant represents almost 20 percent of overall FDI inow
(and more than 25 percent of all supported FDI) in the Central Bohemia region
and virtually all foreign direct investment activity in the district of Kolín. It can
be argued, therefore, that any substantial change in labor market behavior relative
to the performance of comparable districts is caused by the opening of the TPCA
plant.
1.3.2 Information about Kolín
The location of the plant in Kolíns industrial zone (Figure 1.1) was chosen jointly
by TPCA and the government. Another location under consideration was µZatec in
the district of Louny.13 According to TPCA, important characteristics favoring the
Kolín district were the proximity to the capital city of Prague, the short distance to
main railroad and highway corridors and settled land property rights. Specically,
good infrastructure (a connection to main tra¢ c routes and electricity and telecom-
munication networks) was one of the main factors in attracting the investment.
The district of Kolín (situated in the Central Bohemia region) recorded an aver-
age registered unemployment rate of 9.5 percent in 2001, which was slightly above
the national average of 8.5 percent. The arrival of a major investment project was
expected to decrease this rate, although the net impact of the FDI inow might
have been absorbed to some extent by neighboring districts. Table 1.3 presents
12The Czech Republic spent 4.26 billion CZK on nancial incentives during that period of time
(CzechInvest).
13Source: CzechInvest
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the unemployment rate, average wage and average commuting time for the dis-
trict of Kolín and neighboring districts. There are three types of districts in terms
of unemployment rates. The low-unemployment group (Prague-East and Beneov)
benets from the large number of jobs in the capital city, the medium-unemployment
group consists of regional capitals (Pardubice and Hradec Králové) and the high-
unemployment group (Kolín, Kutná Hora and Nymburk) displays an unemploy-
ment rate around 10 percent. The short commuting time to the plant for fellow
high-unemployment districts Kutná Hora and Nymburk disqualies them as control
groups as these districts were most likely also positively a¤ected by the FDI inow
(a discussion about control groups is presented in the next section).
Table 1.4 presents a comparison of the main labor market indicators for Kolín and
the Czech Republic. There is a notable fall in the unemployment in Kolín relative to
the Czech Republic, especially after 2004. This indicates a possible positive impact
of the plant on the local labor market.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the trend in unemployment rates during the period 1997-
2006 for Kolín and neighboring districts. The unemployment rate is expressed rel-
ative to the unemployment rate in a district as of the investment announcement
in December 2001. Prior to this reference date, the unemployment rate in Kolín
oscillated around the regional average, while it displayed a sharp relative decrease
after the plants opening. Thus, a visual inspection suggests the investment could
have had a positive e¤ect on the local unemployment rate.
The evolution of the unemployment rate in Kolín, the whole Central Bohemia
region and the whole country is shown in Figure 1.3. A relatively low unemployment
rate in Central Bohemia stems from the possibility of a daily commute to Prague.
At the time of the investment announcement, denoted by the left-hand vertical line,
the unemployment rate in Kolín was close to the overall unemployment rate in the
Czech Republic. Later on, unemployment rates began to diverge (especially after
2003), when Kolíns local unemployment rate started decreasing at a faster rate than
the overall one.
16
Chapter 1: The Impact of Territorially Concentrated FDI on Local Labor Markets
Simple graphical analysis therefore suggests a better performance of the Kolín
labor market relative to its neighbors or the whole country after the FDI inow. In
order to estimate the net causal impact of the project, however, one needs to lter
out other factors a¤ecting the local labor market. In other words, a proper analysis
needs to specify a rigorous identication strategy of the net e¤ect of the FDI inow.
The methodology and identication strategy for such an analysis are described in
the next two sections.
1.4 Methodology
Unemployment, commonly viewed as a leading labor market indicator, is an outcome
of a dynamic process determined by ows to and out of unemployment. Specically,
a change in unemployment U is caused by changes in outow O from unemployment
and/or inow S into unemployment. Following from this, a separate analysis of
unemployment ows o¤ers a more informative insight into unemployment dynamics
than the aggregate unemployment rate. The number of reported unemployed at the
end of period t is identied as the sum of unemployed at the end of period t 1 plus
the net inow into unemployment during period t, expressed by the intertemporal
unemployment ow identity
Ut  Ut 1 + St  Ot: (1.1)
Dividing by total labor force L and rearranging the terms, the unemployment rate
can be expressed as
ut  ut 1=(1 + gt) + st(1  ut)  otut; (1.2)
where the inow rate s is dened as the inow S divided by the stock of employed
E, the outow rate o as the outow O divided by the stock of unemployed U ,
the unemployment rate u as the stock of unemployed U divided by the labor force
17
Chapter 1: The Impact of Territorially Concentrated FDI on Local Labor Markets
L = U+E, and g is the labor force growth rate, giving the following identity linking
the unemployment rate and the ow rates:
ut  ut 1 + st(1 + gt)
(1 + gt)(1 + st + ot)
: (1.3)
Considering this identity, a separate analysis of unemployment ows is performed
to obtain better information about the sources of unemployment dynamics.14 Build-
ing upon the framework of Burgess and Turon (2005), we assume a linear relationship
for the inow rate and the outow rate:
st = 1ut 1 + 1Xt + 1Qt;2 +  1Qt;3 + '1Qt;4 + 1t; (1.4)
ot = 2ut 1 + 2Xt + 2Qt;2 +  2Qt;3 + '2Qt;4 + 2t; (1.5)
where u is the unemployment rate, Q2, Q3 and Q4 are quarterly dummies con-
trolling for seasonality, and X contains variables describing district labor supply
(educational structure of labor force) and district labor demand (industry structure
of employment) for di¤erent age categories. This reduced form is estimated to iso-
late the e¤ect of the investment on the ow rate, in addition to investigating the
aggregate impact on the unemployment rate. Hence, the interaction between the
unemployment rate and the rates of ow and the contribution of the outow and
inow to a change in the unemployment rate are studied separately.15
Moreover, recognizing that the unemployment outow is a probability-weighted
sum of past inows, where weights indicate the probability of leaving the pool of
unemployed after staying there for di¤erent periods of time, the outow can be
expressed as a function of the past inows and the aggregate exit hazard rates out
of unemployment:
14The unemployment rate, the outow rate and the inow rate in Kolín compared to the rest
of the Czech Republic is presented in Table 1.5.
15Burgess and Turon (2005) examine the dynamics of unemployment ows and stock in the
UK since the late 1960s and show that while outow shocks contributed little to unemployment
dynamics, changes in unemployment were driven primarily by shocks in unemployment inow.
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Ot =
1X
i=0
St iht;i
i 1Y
j=0
(1  ht j;i j): (1.6)
Here, variable ht;i is the exit hazard rate out of unemployment at time t and duration
i and it indicates the probability that a person who is currently unemployed for i time
periods will leave the pool of unemployed during the next period. Exit hazard rates
di¤er for various population cohorts as individuals are heterogenous agents. In the
analysis, exit hazard rates for ve di¤erent unemployment durations are examined,
which provides important information about the underlying source of the change in
the unemployment outow and, consequently, in the unemployment rate.
After inspecting aggregate exit hazard rates, the impact of the investment project
on the local employment rate is estimated. The examined labor market character-
istics may be intertwined and a¤ect each other. Aggregate hazard rates may be
determined by the current state of the economy (business cycle, the local unemploy-
ment rate). Unfortunately, it is di¢ cult to disentangle the specic e¤ect of the local
unemployment rate on the exit hazard rate because of reverse causality and asso-
ciated endogeneity problems. Omitting this variable from the regression, however,
does not present a problem for the empirical analysis as we are interested in the
nal net e¤ect of the investment and not in the internal endogenous processes.
1.5 Identication strategy
We assess the e¤ect of the investment project on local labor market outcomes by
propensity score matching (Rubin, 1974; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), along with
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) matching approach (Heckman et al., 1997). The
main idea of the matching method is to approximate the counterfactual to identify
the impact of a particular treatment on an outcome variable despite the unavail-
ability of experimental data. The propensity score matching procedure involves two
steps: the estimation of the probability of treatment based on observables, estab-
lished by probit estimation, and the restriction of the sample to units with similar
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propensity scores denoting the probability of program participation. The di¤erence-
in-di¤erences estimation is conditioned on similar propensity scores and performed
only on the ensuing sub-sample. When constructing the propensity scores, it is
crucial that these values are independent of the treatment. In order to ensure this,
pre-treatment observations and time-invariant exogenous instrumental variables are
used for estimating the propensity scores.
The probit model estimating the probability of investment project allocation into
a particular district can be written as
Pr(Yi = 1jZi = zi) = (Zi); (1.7)
where the covariates Zi include variables describing district industry structure, ed-
ucational structure of di¤erent age groups, infrastructure density (the amount of
roads and railroads), the share of agricultural land in a district16 and a dummy in-
dicating the designation of an industrial park suitable for hosting foreign investors,
and Pr(Yi = 1jZi = z) indicates the probability that district i belongs ex-ante to the
high-FDI group of districts conditional on observable characteristics. Based on
the FDI inow per capita during the monitored year 2002, all Czech districts (ex-
cluding Prague) were divided ex-post into two complementary groups of districts: a
high-FDIand low-FDIgroup (the distribution of FDI inow is shown in Figure
1.4). The cut-o¤ point is arbitrarily set at 20,000 CZK, classifying 15 percent of the
districts into a high-FDIgroup and the remaining 85 percent into a low-FDI
group.
The probit estimation (which excluded the district of Kolín) assigns a propensity
score to each district (including Kolín), indicating the probability that the particular
district would be a high-FDI type receiving a lot of FDI inow in 2002.17 In
16Anecdotal evidence suggests that greeneld investments are usually allocated on previously
agricultural land.
17The probit estimation used for the calculation of propensity scores is shown in Table 1.7,
suggesting a positive impact of the density of the road network, education of young workforce and
concentration of productive age workers in a manufacturing sector on the probability of high FDI
inow.
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the next step, radius matching is performed and districts with a propensity score
within a certain bandwidth around Kolíns propensity score are selected to be in
the control group as it can be assumed that districts with a similar score faced
the same probability of receiving a large FDI inow.18 Among those in the control
group, the location of investment projects can be considered as random, conditional
on covariates. Two types of district emerge: districts with a propensity score of
receiving a lot of FDI that received a lot of FDI (high-FDI type), and districts
with a propensity score of receiving a lot of FDI that did not receive a lot of FDI
(low-FDItype). In order to estimate the true impact of the investment project,
it is necessary that only the latter group is considered as a counterfactual (control
group one).
An alternative approach to selecting a control group is to consider all districts
in the Czech Republic except Prague19 (control group two, see Table 1.6) or dis-
tricts with an industrial zone established in the same year as the TPCA investment
was realized (control group three).20 Our identication strategy rests on two main
assumptions ensuring that the treated district (Kolín) would behave similarly to
the control group districts in the absence of the investment. First, control group
districts should have received a similar amount of FDI as Kolín would, not receiving
the treatment. Second, there should be a notable similarity between the control
group and Kolín in terms of labor market structure and the propensity to attract a
large-scale FDI.
In the case of control groups one and three, the rst assumption is satised by
construction.21 This is also supported empirically as an increase in FDI stock per
capita for the control groups between 2001 and 2006 was comparable to that observed
18The similarity measure is arbitrarily set at a three-percent bandwidth around Kolíns propen-
sity score. A robustness check with alternative bandwidths (ve percent, seven percent) did not
change the sign or signicance of the estimates (for the sake of brevity these checks are not reported
in the paper).
19Prague is excluded due to its specic labor market characterized by an abundance of jobs and
an extremely low unemployment rate.
20The districts included in the three control groups are presented in Table 1.8.
21As stated above, only districts classied as low-FDIare considered for those control groups.
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in Kolín without the TPCA investment.22 The second assumption is satised for
control group one, since the use of propensity score matching ensures its similarity to
Kolín conditional on observable covariates, thus, results for the rst control group are
the most plausible. The second control group poses an intrinsic risk of incorporating
districts inherently di¤erent from Kolín and the third control group can potentially
lead to biased estimates due to the fact that the decision about industrial zone
creation may be a¤ected by unobservable factors. The use of the district of Louny
(containing µZatec, which was the other location under consideration for the TPCA
investment) as a suitable control group is made impossible due to the fact that
µZatec eventually also became a high-FDI recipient following the designation of the
Triangle industrial zone.
A drawback of propensity score matching is that it does not control for unob-
servable characteristics, which can lead to a bias in the estimate of the true impact
when unobservables are heterogeneous and correlated with the error term. One way
to overcome this problem is to include instrumental variables a¤ecting the invest-
ment decision but not labor market outcomes. In reality, however, it is often di¢ cult
to nd appropriate instruments. Using panel data, we can exploit changes in out-
comes between the treated and control group over time by including xed e¤ects
capturing unobserved heterogeneity among districts and by performing di¤erence-in-
di¤erences regression to obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment e¤ect (Angrist
and Krueger, 1997; Heckman et al., 1997).
22Between 2001 and 2006, the FDI stock per capita in Kolín increased overall by 257% (from
80.7 thousand to 288.4 thousand CZK), however, excluding the TPCA investment, it increased
only by 45.2% (171.2 out of 288.4 thousand CZK corresponded to the TPCA project). FDI per
capita in control group 1 increased by 26% (from 83.3 to 104.9 thousand CZK), in control group
2 by 49% (from 109.4 to 162.8 thousand CZK) and in control group 3 by 35% (from 76.5 to 103.3
thousand CZK).
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1.5.1 Econometric specication
Econometric analysis of the impact of the investment on labor market outcomes is
performed by estimating the following di¤erence-in-di¤erences equation:
yit = i + + MAN30it + MAN50it + COL30it + COL50it + Y EARt +
+Q2 +  Q3 + 'Q4 + INVit + it; yit : uit; empit; oit; sit, (1.8)
where MAN30 and MAN50 measure the share of people employed in the manu-
facturing sector in the population aged 15-29 and 30-49, respectively, and COL30
and COL50 denote the share of college or university graduates in the population
aged 15-29 and 30-49, respectively. The variable Y EAR captures the time trend;
dummies Q2, Q3, Q4 control for seasonal e¤ects; INV is a dummy indicating the
investment project in Kolín;23 i are xed e¤ects; , , , , , , ,  , ' and 
are the parameters of the model and it is a noise term. The coe¢ cient  captures
the true causal e¤ect of the investment project on the dependent variable (local
unemployment rate, employment rate, inow rate, outow rate).
When estimating the set of equations for exit hazard rates from unemployment,
it should be noted that given the nature of ows between unemployment dura-
tions, the hazard rates for di¤erent unemployment durations are not independent.
The most appropriate model for the analysis of aggregate exit hazard rates is the
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model (Zellner ,1962) as it accounts for a
possible correlation of standard errors across equations. The following specication
23The dummy takes value 0 before a structural break and 1 after the break. The date of the
announcement of the TPCA investment was December 2001 and, therefore, the beginning of 2002
is used as a trend break. Alternative dates are used for a robustness check, given that the very
announcement may not have had an immediate impact on the labor market, and a time delay in
the e¤ectivity of the impact is allowed for. A dummy indicating the transitory period after the
announcement is introduced and several specications with di¤erent spans are examined. Zivot &
Andrewstest for determining structural breaks is performed for unemployment outow and inow.
This test suggests that the trend break for outow is September 2002 (a date corresponding to
the start of the hiring process for the company) and the break for inow is May 2005 (a date two
months after the full production process began). These ndings indicate that the start of the hiring
process had a big impact on the outow rate from unemployment. On the other side, the inow
rate changed substantially after the start of production, indicating a high uctuation of workers.
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is estimated:
hk:it = k + kX it + kY EARt + kQ2 +  kQ3 + 'kQ4 + kINVit +
+ !kDISTRi + uk;it for k = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; (1.9)
where the set of ve exit hazard equations corresponds to ve di¤erent unemploy-
ment durations: 0-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-9 months, 9-12 months and more than
12 months. The variable X includes characteristics describing the structure of the
labor force specied above (share of people employed in manufacturing and share of
college or university graduates); Y EAR is a time trend capturing aggregate factors
a¤ecting the exit hazard rate; Q2, Q3, Q4 are quarterly seasonal dummies; INV is a
dummy for the investment project in Kolín; DISTRi are dummies for each district
in the control group and u is an error term. Coe¢ cient  then estimates the causal
e¤ect of the investment project on the exit hazard rates out of unemployment.
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique used in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimation (1.8) implicitly assumes a normal distribution of the coe¢ cient of key
interest. This assumption may lead to an underestimation of its true standard
error even after accounting for serially correlated outcomes by clustering across
districts due to autocorrelation of the data (Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan,
2002). Another factor reinforcing the underestimation of the standard deviation is
the fact that the treatment variable rarely changes over time.
One way to correct for the bias is to create standard errors and critical values
based on the actual distribution of the estimator bootstrapped from the data. Thus,
besides using conventional standard errors, alternative standard errors generated by
the bootstrapping technique are reported. Importantly, the block bootstrapped
standard errors do not change the sign or the signicance of the estimates.
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1.6 Data
Detailed empirical analysis is based on unemployment data from the Unemployment
Registry (UR), the Labor Force Survey (LFS) and FDI data from the Czech National
Bank (CNB).
The UR data contains information from District Labor O¢ ces on the number
of registered unemployed. The data covers the period 1998 - 2006 and includes
district-level information about unemployment ows into and out of unemployment
on a monthly basis and the structure of unemployment by education, age, gender
and unemployment duration on a quarterly basis.
The Labor Force Survey24 is conducted quarterly using a rotating household
sample of around 25,000 households (60,000 individuals) and is representative of the
population of the Czech Republic.25 The survey includes information about individ-
ual labor market status, age, education, sector of employment/duration of unem-
ployment and other characteristics which allow specifying the population share of
specic age, education and employment cohorts in each district during each quarter.
In the analysis, the LFS data during the years 1998-2006 are used in constructing
district-level panel data for eight consecutive quarters.
The CNB provides district-level FDI data on a yearly basis. FDI is dened as
a capital investment from abroad that maintains a permanent equity relation with
a company in the source country and owns a dened share of domestic company
equity (in the host country).26 The level of FDI is then measured as a sum of three
components: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans.
24The survey is conducted according to the recommendations of the International Labour Or-
ganization and Eurostat methodology, which ensures that the obtained data are in line with the
standard interpretation of labor market characteristics.
25Households are chosen randomly and each member of a chosen household is interviewed so
that all age, social and economic groups are represented in the sample. Based on the most recent
demographic census, each individual is assigned a weight representing the overall district-, age-
and gender-specic cohorts in the population to remove any discrepancy between the structure of
the sample and the structure of the population.
26Firms with at least 10 percent of foreign ownership share are dened as foreign.
25
Chapter 1: The Impact of Territorially Concentrated FDI on Local Labor Markets
1.7 Results
We start the evaluation of the FDI impact on the local labor market with an analysis
of overall unemployment and overall employment. The next step is to examine
unemployment ows since these are the underlying processes behind changes in
the stock of unemployed. Finally, we address the role of aggregate exit hazard
rates and identify duration categories that contributed the most to the change in
unemployment.
1.7.1 Unemployment
Following the specication in equation (1.8), we estimate the impact of FDI on
the unemployment rate for the three comparison groups (Table 1.9). Comparison
group one (districts with similar propensity scores for receiving investment, but not
receiving much FDI) should yield the most precise estimates (as argued above),
therefore we focus on this control group.
There is a possibility that neither the start of the construction of the site nor the
start of the production process is the most appropriate structural break and it takes
some time before the investment a¤ects the local labor market. Therefore, we allow
for a delay in the investment taking e¤ect by including a dummy variable Imp_mid
indicating the length of the transitory period in years. For each comparison group,
we report four estimates di¤ering in the length of this transitory period.
There is a statistically signicant positive e¤ect on the unemployment rate, which
decreased by 1.7 to 3.8 percentage points depending on the time since the invest-
ment.27 A decrease in the local unemployment rate by 1.7 percentage points cor-
27As can be seen from Table 1.9, the estimated impact of the plant opening on the unemployment
rate is the largest for the rst control group and the smallest for the third control group although,
intuitively, the third control group (consisting of districts with a designated industrial zone but still
a low-FDIcategory) should be in between the rst and the second group; the low estimate for this
control group may be explained by the tendency of establishing industrial zones in districts with
unobserved relative disadvantage (this decision is at the governments discretion). In addition,
industrial zones may have attracted also domestic rms not captured in FDI data, which may have
contributed to a small and insignicant estimate of the trend break. A similar argument holds for
the outow rate (Table 1.12).
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responds roughly to 800 additional unemployed workers nding a job due to the
investment project, which makes the impact of the investment project also econom-
ically signicant. This number, however, is not necessarily equal to the net im-
pact of the investment on local unemployment due to secondary e¤ects (spillovers,
crowding-out) and possible migration and transition from out-of-the-labor-force.
1.7.2 Employment
Figure 1.5 shows the employment rate, labor force, participation rate and unem-
ployment rate for Kolín during the years preceding and following the TPCA invest-
ment.28 Visual inspection suggests that the participation rate maintained its level
at approximately 70 percent and experienced an increase starting in 2005. There
was a steady increase in the employment rate and a decrease in the unemployment
rate over the years 1999-2004, however, this trend is more pronounced after 2004 as
evidenced by sharper curves. This may be the e¤ect of inward FDI, but it is possible
that the conditions on the labor market were improving prior to the arrival of the
investor, giving a signicant positive trend throughout the whole period. Filtering
out overall trends, a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation yields a positive and lasting
true impact on the employment rate, which signicantly increased by 3.7 percent-
age points (Table 1.10). Since the productive age population (15-65 years of age) in
Kolín during 2002-06 was approximately 68,000, this percentage change corresponds
to an absolute increase in employment of almost 2,500 individuals.29
The number of created vacancies reported by TPCA was 3,000. From anecdotal
evidence it is known that approximately one half of the workers migrated from
abroad or from other districts.30 Presuming that most of these workers are not
28The employment rate is calculated as a fraction of the currently employed people divided by
the total working-age population (15-65 years of age), the participation rate as a share of active
people (employed or currently searching for a job) in the total working-age population and the
unemployment rate as a fraction of the unemployed divided by the active labor force.
29The discrepancy between the number of unemployed nding a job and net employment gen-
eration may be explained by the out-of-the-labor-force individuals becoming employed.
30These workers may be underrepresented in the Labor Force Survey data as most of them
still possess a di¤erent place of residence or live in long-term dormitories, which are not included
in the survey. Indeed, examination of the net migration rate shows an increase of 0.2 to 0.5
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captured in the LFS, the reported number should be adjusted so that it includes
only workers from the district. This gives us 1,500 individuals, which, compared
with the estimated 2,500, indicates a positive spillover of approximately an extra
1,000 individuals who found a job due to the plant opening, but not in the plant
itself.
Overall, the TPCA automobile investment in Kolín seems to have positively
a¤ected local employment. Considering that 1,500 local workers were hired by the
investor (one half of the created vacancies reported by TPCA) and the estimated
increase in employment was 2,500, there was a positive spillover of roughly 1,000
individuals who found a job indirectly due to FDI inow.31
The increase in employment can be divided into inows from local unemployment
(800 workers) and out-of-the-labor-force or migrants (the remaining 1,700 workers).
The medium-term spillover e¤ects on suppliers or other industries have been positive
and outweighed possible crowding-out e¤ects due to backward or forward linkages
for domestic rms and distributors.
1.7.3 Unemployment outow and inow
The evolution of unemployment ows in Kolín is mapped on Figure 1.6. There
appears to be a trend of decreasing inow and less pronounced increasing outow
starting from 2003. Visual illustration, therefore, suggests that there could have
been a positive impact of TPCA on the levels of unemployment through a higher
outow rate.
Tables 1.12 and 1.13 present the results of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estima-
tions of the e¤ect of the investment project on the outow and inow rates for the
three comparison groups. We focus on comparison group one as above. There is
a signicant positive e¤ect on unemployment outow, which experienced a statisti-
percentage points, which corresponds to 200 to 500 registered individuals migrating to Kolín (see
Table 1.11). Therefere, it can be inferred that at least 1,000 individuals without permanent or
temporary residence were attracted by the plant opening.
31This is a lower bound as the estimate does not capture likely positive long-term externalites
such as knowledge spillovers and human capital improvement.
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cally and economically signicant increase by 2.6 percentage points. If allowed for
the transitory period between the start of the investment project and the time the
e¤ect actually takes place, the impact rises to 3 to 5.5 percentage points (increas-
ing with the length of the delay). In contrast, the impact of TPCA on the inow
into unemployment is always statistically insignicant even when allowing for the
time delay (column 3 in Table 1.13). The TPCA investment, therefore, increased
the unemployment outow rate while leaving the inow rate into unemployment
una¤ected, thereby implying a decrease in the average duration of unemployment.
1.7.4 Exit hazard rates
The results of equation (1.9) estimating the impact of the TPCA investment project
on aggregate exit hazard rates for di¤erent durations are displayed in Table 1.14.
A positive and statistically signicant increase in the aggregate exit hazard rate for
leaving unemployment during the following three months for durations of less than
9 months is identied but no signicant e¤ect is found for durations greater than
9 months. The probability of leaving unemployment during the following quarter
increased by 2.5, 3.1 and 4.4 percentage points for durations less than 3, 6 and
9 months, respectively. The e¤ect seems to vanish, however, for unemployment
durations more than 9 months. This important result illustrates the fact that the
plant opening improves the chances of short-term unemployed to nd a job while
the prospects of long-term unemployed remained the same as before. Moreover,
the ndings indicate that aggregate hazard rates are not only smaller for longer
durations (due to individual heterogeneity and negative duration dependence)32 but
long-term unemployed possess limited ability to return to employment and capitalize
on new job opportunities, which is a key goal of the government in its e¤ort to battle
unemployment persistence and decrease the share of long-term unemployed. This
observation may be attributed to certain stigma e¤ects of long-term unemployed and
32Unemployment dynamics and aggregagate duration data in the Czech Republic are analyzed
in Franta (2008) who nds that both unobserved heterogeneity and individual duration dependence
contribute to aggregate duration dependence.
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a deterioration of skills (duration dependence) but also to initial lower human capital
endowment and an ensuing mismatch on the labor market (unobserved heterogeneity
of agents).
1.7.5 Placebo simulations
We use placebo simulations to test the bias of the estimates and, using one thou-
sand placebo interventions, we estimate the size of the impact and its standard error
for each of them. If the standard errors are unbiased, the fraction of rejected null
hypotheses of no impact should be roughly ve percent (under the 95 percent sig-
nicance level). If the rejection rate is considerably higher, the standard errors are
likely to be biased downwards. Placebo interventions are, therefore, adopted as a
robustness check for the consistency of standard errors.
A simulation of an intervention is performed by randomly choosing a district and
a point in time, and then a dummy variable PLACit is created indicating that at
that time and in that given district a large concentrated FDI project began. The
following regression is then estimated:
yit = i++MANUFit+COL30it+COL50it+Y EARt+Q2+ Q3+'Q4+PLACit+it;
(1.10)
where the explanatory variables are the same as in equation (1.8), the only di¤erence
being the variable PLAC indicating the placebo intervention. Estimated coe¢ cients
are stored and the procedure is repeated a thousand times in order to obtain coe¢ -
cients for the supposed placebo intervention and its signicance. If standard errors
are consistent, the rejection rate for the intervention variable PLAC should be ap-
proximately ve percent. In other words, the coe¢ cient  should be statistically
signicant in ve percent of the cases.
Using placebo interventions, rejection rates for ordinary OLS standard errors and
bootstrapped standard errors are compared. Table 1.15 reports rejection rates of
the null hypothesis of no e¤ect for di¤erent specications. Using 1,000 simulations,
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a serious overestimation of the signicance levels is found in the case of conventional
standard errors (between 30 and 46 percent for control group 3). Block bootstrap-
ping helps to deal with this issue and, compared to conventional standard errors,
block bootstrapped standard errors lead to a decrease in the number of falsely re-
jected null hypotheses for all analyzed labor market indicators (e.g. from 30.6 to
12 percent in the case of the employment rate), though there remains a slight over-
rejection even when using bootstrapped standard errors.33 The block bootstrapped
technique did not change the signicance of the estimates, therefore it is reasonable
to claim that there really was a signicant and positive impact of the project on the
local labor market.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the TPCA investment project (the largest
foreign investment project in the Czech Republic between 1993-2006) in the district
of Kolín on local labor market performance. Our identication strategy rests on a
comparison of Kolín with control groups of districts. Control group districts did not
experience as large an FDI inux as Kolín, but otherwise resemble Kolín in terms
of labor market structure and the propensity to attract a large one-o¤ FDI inow.
Using di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation, the investigation of the dynamics of
the unemployment rate, the employment rate, unemployment ows and aggregate
exit hazard rates out of unemployment indicates a positive and signicant (both
statistically and economically) impact on the unemployment rate, which decreases
by 1.7 percentage points. The impact on the employment rate is also positive as the
employment rate increases by 3.7 percentage points following the TPCA investment.
Thus, the investment project a¤ected the whole district positively: the estimated
number of people who found a job exceeded the number of employees at TPCA.
Since it is known from anecdotal evidence that more than half of the workers in
33Bertrand et al. (2003) note that the block bootstrap performs well when the number of groups
is large enough.
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the company migrated to get a job at TPCA, there must have been a substantial
spillover on suppliers or other industries. To summarize, the local labor market
arguably beneted from FDI inow and a crowding-out e¤ect to counteract direct
vacancies created by such a project appears not to have occurred.
The main factor that contributed to the unemployment decrease was an increase
in outow rate from unemployment of 2.6 percentage points while the inow rate
into unemployment remained una¤ected. As can be deduced from the exit hazard
rates analysis, a higher outow rate and a subsequent decrease in average duration
is driven primarily by a rise in aggregate exit hazard rates from unemployment with
a duration of less than 9 months, increasing by 2.5, 3.2 and 4.4 percentage points in
the three duration categories. On the other hand, unemployment durations greater
than 9 months do not display any signicant impact of the investment project,
illustrating the alarming fact that only short-term unemployed benet from a new
plant opening. This nding points to a persistence of unemployment and asserts
that the long-term unemployed remain intact with government-driven job creation
schemes. Returning this group of unemployed into the working process remains one
of the main challenges of policymaking.
Various robustness checks such as di¤erent specications of time delay to ac-
count for a possible lag in the investment impact, alternative estimates of standard
errors (bootstrapped from the data) and simulations of placebo interventions were
applied since there is some doubt about the consistency of conventional di¤erence-in-
di¤erences standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2003). Indeed, a serious underestimation
of the standard deviation of the simple OLS estimates was found and, therefore, a
blocked bootstrap technique was used to compute standard errors. The consistency
of standard errors was checked by placebo simulations, where a thousand placebo in-
terventions were randomly generated. Block bootstrapping substantially reduces the
number of false rejections of the null hypothesis, however, the rejection rate is still
slightly greater than ve percent. Most importantly, the estimates do not change
magnitude or signicance and the results remain valid under di¤erent specications.
32
Chapter 1: The Impact of Territorially Concentrated FDI on Local Labor Markets
Considering the investment incentive for TPCA (1.78 billion CZK) and its es-
timated net impact on unemployment (800 unemployed individuals nding a job),
the nancial subsidy per one created job amounts to 2.23 million CZK. A simple per
capita comparison of pecuniary costs incurred and expenditures saved on benets
to unemployed can provide a useful assessment benchmark of the relative price of
this subsidy. Saved benets can be calculated as the sum of average yearly direct
unemployment benets, taxes and social insurance contributions imposed on wages.
Elbona (2005) asserts that the average yearly direct unemployment compensation
is about 0.12 million CZK per one unemployed and 0.175 million CZK if lost tax
revenues are considered. Based on these approximations, the investment project
would pay o¤, in simple monetary terms, if jobs created would be secured for at
least twelve years. Should the investor decide to move the production after 2015,
twelve years since the jobs were created, the whole project would bring a net scal
gain.
However, such approximations should be considered cautiously. Firstly, we pro-
vide only the medium-term impact of a relatively recent policy intervention, while
long-term outcomes will be revealed only after many years. Secondly, our estimates
do not capture the long-term net spillover e¤ect, likely a positive one, a¤ecting the
rest of the country beyond the borders of the Kolín district. Thirdly, one can hardly
predict whether the large investment project in Kolín prevented some other projects
from coming in the future. Therefore, at this moment, it is too daring to hypoth-
esize about the long-term impact on the local labor market or the whole country.
However, we can conclude that the FDI incentives seem to scally worthy as it is
likely the production plant will remain producing for at least twelve years  the
upper bound of the minimum time required to produce a payo¤.
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1.10 Appendix
Figure 1.1: The location of the TPCA investment in Kolín
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Figure 1.2: The unemployment rate in Kolín and neighboring districts
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Figure 1.3: The unemployment rate in Kolín, Central Bohemia and the Czech
Republic
4
6
8
10
12
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
(%
)
2000m1 2001m7 2003m1 2004m7 2006m1
2000m7 2002m1 2003m7 2005m1 2006m7
Date
Kolín Czech Republic Central Bohemia
Source: District Labor Offices
First line represents the announcement of the investment in 12/2001, second line the start of hiring in 12/2002
Deseasonalized comparison (district, region, country)
38
Chapter 1: The Impact of Territorially Concentrated FDI on Local Labor Markets
Figure 1.4: The distribution of FDI inow per capita (excluding Prague)
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Figure 1.5: Employment, participation and unemployment rates in Kolín
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Figure 1.6: Unemployment ows in Kolín
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Table 1.1: Yearly GDP growth in real prices (percent)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Czech Republic 6.4 4.0 -0.7 -0.8 1.3 3.6 2.5 1.9 3.6 6.1
Hungary 1.5 1.3 4.6 5.1 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.5 2.8 3.8
Poland 7.0 6.2 7.1 5.0 4.5 4.2 1.1 1.4 3.8 5.3
Slovakia 6.9 6.6 5.7 3.7 0.3 0.7 3.2 4.1 4.2 5.4
Source: World Bank, Czech Statistical O¢ ce, Slovak Statistical O¢ ce.
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Table 1.2: FDI over time at the country, regional and district level
The table presents a comparison of overall FDI and the share of state-supported FDI for units with
di¤erent details of aggregation which are host to the TPCA investment project. The third column
presents the change in the stock of foreign direct investment between 1998 and 2006 obtained
from the Czech National Bank data. The fourth column contains the amount of supported FDI
self-reported by investors to the state agency CzechInvest and the last column reports the share of
supported investment on the overall foreign direct investment (the overestimation of eventual FDI
may arise from the fact that planned investment magnitude is reported prior to the realization
of an investment project and that the completion of the whole project may be distributed over a
longer period of time).
FDI supported FDI
bil. CZK 1998 2006 1998-2006 1998-2006 %
Czech Republic 429,2 1666,8 1237,6 434,2 35,1
Czech Republic (w/o Prague) 227,7 781,4 553,7 424,2 76,6
Central Bohemia region 52,9 183,9 131,0 93,9 71,7
Kolín district 0,8 15,3 14,5 29,6 204,0
TPCA 23,5
Source: Czech National Bank, CzechInvest.
Table 1.3: Characteristics of Kolin and neighbouring districts
Ur Wage Distance Time
(%) (CZK) (km) (min)
Kolín 9.5 13,476 5 6
Beneov 3.2 13,080 55 55
Hradec Králové 6.1 14,015 71 60
Kutná Hora 10.5 12,454 12 15
Nymburk 8.6 12,962 21 20
Pardubice 5.4 13,800 48 45
Prague - East 2.9 16,667 50 45
Source: µCSÚ (2001), authors own calculations.
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Table 1.5: Comparison of Kolin and the rest of the Czech Republic (excluding
Prague)
The outow rate (o) is calculated as a share of people leaving the pool of unemployed among
unemployed, the inow rate is the percentage of people becoming unemployed out of employed
individuals and the unemployment rate is calculated as a share of unemployed among the active
labor force.
Kolín CR (w/o Prague & Kolín)
o (%) s (%) u (%) o (%) s (%) u (%)
1998 14.57 1.27 6.92 13.71 1.20 6.76
1999 12.15 1.48 9.91 11.36 1.36 9.38
2000 13.12 1.41 10.24 12.21 1.26 9.74
2001 13.69 1.40 9.48 11.90 1.22 9.26
2002 13.09 1.41 9.35 10.58 1.27 9.97
2003 12.03 1.35 9.96 9.87 1.24 10.76
2004 13.42 1.36 9.43 10.19 1.25 10.96
2005 14.06 1.20 8.43 10.58 1.17 10.38
2006 16.39 1.08 6.84 11.60 1.09 9.47
2007 18.66 1.05 6.29 13.99 1.00 8.52
Source: Unemployment Registry (District Labor O¢ ces), Czech Statistical O¢ ce (2007).
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Table 1.7: Estimates from a probit regression used for the calculation of propensity
scores
probit regression
dy/dx std
AGRI -0.003 (0.003)
ROAD 0.004 (0.002)
COL30 0.031 (0.014)
COL50 -0.003 (0.008)
MANUF30 -0.005 (0.005)
MANUF50 0.010 (0.006)
Note: Marginal e¤ects from a probit regression evaluated at the means of independent variables
with the dummy indicating a high-FDIdistrict. Districts with an FDI-per-capita inow above
20 thousand CZK during 2002 were classied as high-FDI(about 20 percent of all districts) and
the remaining districts were classied as low-FDI. The variable AGRI indicates the share of
agricultural land on the total area of a district, the variable ROAD denotes the density of roads
per 100 square kilometres, COL30 and COL50 indicate the share of college educated population
between 18 and 30 years and between 30 and 50 years, respectively, and MANUF30 and MANUF50
stand for the empoyment share in a manufacturing sector for the same age cohorts. Signicance
level: * 5%.
Table 1.8: Control groups
1 2 3
Kladno all districts Litomµeµrice
Sokolov excluding Prague Louny
Dµeµcín Chrudim
Jiµcín Jiµcín
Svitavy Frýdek-Místek
Trutnov
Note: Control group 1 is based on the propensity score of belonging to a high-FDI group. A
simple probit estimation (excluding Kolín) controlling for district infrastructure, educational and
industry structure is used to estimate the propensity of receiving treatment (a lot of FDI) and the
subgroup of districts with a similar propensity score as Kolín (within a certain bandwidth) that
belongs to a low-FDIgroup represents the appropriate control group. Control group 2 contains
all disticts except Prague. Control group 3 consists of districts where a new industrial zone started
in 2002 (as in Kolín) but which despite this fact still belong to the low-FDI category (Kolín
belongs to the high-FDIcategory due to the TPCA investment).
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Table 1.14: Impact of the investment project on aggregate exit hazard rates
Control group Reference
1 2 3
Duration 0-3 months
1 2.528
 2.023 2.502 46.98
(1.164) (0.359) (0.978)
Const 39.849 48.228 47.607
(3.726) (1.459) (3.446)
Duration 3-6 months
2 3.152
 1.747 1.230 35.35
(1.264) (0.346) (1.478)
Const 30.983 39.949 27.205
(5.228) (1.646) (5.636)
Duration 6-9 months
3 4.377
 2.149 0.888 38.51
(1.181) (0.288) (1.278)
Const 37.575 45.141 35.728
(4.536) (1.074) (2.210)
Duration 9-12 months
4 0.290 -0.899
 -0.538 27.13
(1.679) (0.326) (1.252)
Const 26.258 34.456 25.634
(7.622) (1.494) (4.506)
Duration >12 month
5 0.983 0.062 0.777 18.73
(0.534) (0.955) (0.563)
Const 15.705 30.579 17.142
(1.491) (1.321) (1.449)
Joint sign. of  0.012 0.043 0.117
N 252 2584 204
Note: The table reports estimates from equation (1.9) with aggregate exit hazard rate out of
unemployment as a dependent variable. Columns (1)-(3) present the results of the estimation
of the e¤ects of the plant opening on the exit hazard rate out of unemployment for di¤erent
unemployment durations and report the impact on the exit hazard rate in percentage points.
Column (4) o¤ers a comparison of the impact with the reference hazard rate in Kolín during 2001
(the year prior to the announcement of the investment project). The estimation includes xed-
e¤ects, quarterly dummies controlling for seasonal e¤ects and variables capturing district industry
and educational structure. The impact of the investment project is estimated using three di¤erent
control groups. The rst control group consists of districts chosen by propensity matching, the
second control group includes all districts except for Prague and the third control group uses
districts with a newly designated industrial zone. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and
clustered from the data. Signicance levels: *** 0.1 %, ** 1 %, * 5 %.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Investment Incentives
in Regional FDI Reallocation: A
Regression-Discontinuity
Approach
2.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often viewed as a crucial part of economic de-
velopment and job creation. Policymakers, therefore, often employ various FDI
promotion measures such as direct FDI subsidies or tax reliefs. On the other hand,
a sceptical stance towards FDI promotion nds the costs of such a policy too high
and argues that investment inow would have occurred even in the absence of the
investment. Thus, the economic merit of FDI subsidies is not straightforward and
should be subjected to careful analysis. An evaluation of the impact of FDI subsidies
on the economy can be split into two parts: rst, estimating the e¤ect of subsidies
on FDI inow and its distribution, and, second, identifying the e¤ect of FDI on
productivity.
This paper concentrates on the former link between FDI subsidies and FDI at-
traction: it studies the impact of introducing a formal investment incentive scheme in
An earlier version of this work has been published as CERGE-EI Working Paper 438/2011.
All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the author.
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the Czech Republic on regional distribution of FDI and assesses whether it is possible
to alter location decisions of foreign investors. Specically, using district-level data,
the magnitude and the signicance of changes in regional FDI per capita resulting
from the adoption of the investment incentive program is quantied.1 In addition,
the importance of conventional FDI determinants such as educational structure,
industry structure and geographic factors is inspected.
Concerning the impact of FDI on economic growth and productivity, there exist a
fair amount of studies identifying FDI as an engine of economic growth, employment
generation and poverty alleviation (Campos and Kinoshita, 2002; Tondl and Vuksic,
2003). Apart from strengthening the competitive environment in a host country,
FDI promotes international trade and enhances host country productivity through
multiple channels: capital formation, greenelds and takeovers, technology transfers,
skill enhancements and knowledge spillovers.2 These spillovers occur when domestic
rms improve their know-how by technology imitation or knowledge di¤usion, or
domestic workers increase their skills through training programs in foreign companies
(Crozet et al., 2004) and can be realized through horizontal (competition within the
sector) or vertical (supply) channels. Javorcik (2004) studies horizontal and vertical
spillover e¤ects in Lithuania between 1996-2000, nding no signicant horizontal
spillover e¤ects. However, she nds a positive and signicant vertical spillover e¤ect
of FDI on domestic rms. Concerning the Czech Republic, Stanµcík (2007) o¤ers
a summary of recent FDI spillover literature and analyzes the e¤ects of FDI on
the sales growth rate of domestic companies. He addresses a potential endogeneity
of FDI with respect to future industry growth and nds negative horizontal and
vertical e¤ects, particularly in upstream sectors. In a more specic study of Czech
takeovers, Jurajda and Stanµcík (2009) nd a varying impact of foreign takeovers on
1It should be noted that the focus of this analysis is not across-country FDI attraction, but
rather within-country FDI allocation. In other words, assuming that FDI comes to the country,
we study whether it is possible to direct FDI ows to distressed regions with the aid of government
policy tools. Across-country comparison would require analysis of investment schemes of neigh-
boring countries and is beyond the scope of this paper. For an across-country analysis of FDI
determinants in transition countries, see, e.g., Bevan and Estrin (2000).
2See De Mello (1997) or Ozturk (2007) for a survey of literature on FDI growth e¤ects.
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domestic acquisitions according to industry sectors and target markets: the e¤ect of
takeovers on rmsvarious performance indicators is signicantly positive for non-
exporting manufacturing industries; while it decreases in the case of export-oriented
rms and vanishes entirely for service-sector rms.
The role of FDI in the world economy rose steadily during last two decades,
in especially in post-communist countries (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).3 In the Czech
Republic, a systematic approach to FDI promotion was adopted in 2001, providing
foreign investors with a possibility to receive a nancial subsidy per created vacancy
or a retraining subsidy. A fundamental feature of this incentive system is that the
exact amount of the subsidy is di¤erent across districts, o¤ering higher investment
incentives in districts with higher unemployment rates, thereby motivating investors
to locate in more distressed regions. The identication strategy is based on a discon-
tinuity represented by an unemployment level threshold which divides districts into
several eligibility groups. Districts with the unemployment rate su¢ ciently close
to a cuto¤ point are considered as randomly assigned into treatment and control
groups, and a regression-discontinuity (RD) estimation is employed for identifying
the causal impact of the program.
The motivation for this study is threefold. First, the topic is highly policy-
relevant, and the evaluation of the investment incentives impact proposes practi-
cal implications: understanding the mechanisms behind foreign investorsdecision
process may improve policymakersability to direct FDI inows into more distressed
regions. Second, there is a lot of public money involved in investment policy funding,
hence, from a social stance, it is necessary to assess the e¢ ciency of the incentive
system. On one hand, FDI inow contributes to regional development and income
growth (Wen, 2007), thereby decreasing public spending on unemployment benets
and social assistance. On the other hand, huge amounts of state subsidies require
substantial budget spending. A proper evaluation of investment incentives requires
a correct assessment of costs as well as benets, the keystone being the identica-
3There was a modest decline in FDI ows in 2008 due to the global economic slowdown.
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tion of what would happen without the adoption of the scheme. Third, there is
a lack of literature that rigorously evaluates investment incentives in the Central
European region. This paper presents a contribution to the discussion on the role
and appropriateness of public policies in FDI reallocation by combining a rigorous
identication strategy and policy relevance.
2.2 Literature survey
Empirical studies on FDI determinants di¤er in the focus of their analysis - some
concentrate on macroeconomic variables (gross domestic product, ination, unem-
ployment, price level) while others emphasize institutional (political climate, law en-
forcement) or location factors (quality of infrastructure, human capital endowment,
proximity of target markets). Another segmentation of the research regards time
horizon: studies adopt a cross-section of countries or panel data. An advantage of a
panel dataset is that it allows the identication of important location determinants
- such as a policy change - by exploiting the variation over time. Lastly, empirical
literature concerning FDI determinants can be divided into between-country and
within-country studies depending on whether it focuses on an international compar-
ison or a regional analysis within a particular country.4
Considering within-country studies, seminal research on FDI inow determinants
is represented by Carlton (1983) and Coughlin et al. (1991), who analyze U.S. rms
location determinants on state and county levels. Analogical studies emerged in
other countries such as Brazil (Hansen, 1987) or China (OECD, 2000). These studies
focused on the relation between the characteristics of a region and FDI inow. In the
case of the U.S., states with a higher per capita income and higher manufacturing
activity attracted FDI while higher wages and higher taxes deterred it (Coughlin
et al., 1991). Specic to automotive-related industries, Smith and Florida (1994)
nd that agglomeration economies matter for Japanese manufacturing plants. New
4See Bloningen (2005) for a comprehensive survey of literature on FDI determinants.
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establishments preferred locations in close proximity to Japanese assemblers and
with higher overall manufacturing density. Surprisingly, contrary to the prevailing
literature, higher wages and higher concentration of minorities are recognized as
positive and signicant determinants of FDI inow.
Country-specic studies suggest that signicance of various FDI determinants
di¤ers across countries: in the case of Portugal, the strongest primary location factor
is agglomeration of the service industry and the distance from principal cities, while
regional labor costs do not matter in foreign rmsdecision processes (Guimaraes et
al., 2000). On the contrary, in an analysis of FDI location in Italy during 1986-1999,
Basile (2004) nds local labor costs to be signicant. Specically, he claims that the
main FDI determinants di¤er according to the type of foreign entry mode. Acquisi-
tions are attracted by agglomeration economies, emulating the overall distribution
of existing rms, and consider high-unemployment regions as less attractive for their
location. On the contrary, greeneld investments are not a¤ected by agglomeration
economies and view high-unemployment regions as a signal of available labor force
and thus attractive. Overall, the author assesses that FDI to the southern part of
Italy is below its potential and calls for the implementation of regionally diversied
scal policies in order to overcome large regional di¤erences in economic growth.
Turning to the empirical evidence from the Czech Republic, Valachyová (2005)
emphasizes that FDI inow into the manufacturing sector follows the geographi-
cal distribution of the manufacturing industry at the beginning of transition. In
addition, she observes a larger greeneld FDI inux for locations bordering with
Germany and Austria and regions with better infrastructure and business services.
Also, she nds a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of industry-specic ag-
glomeration.
International studies analyzing country-level FDI determinants nd business en-
vironment, labor costs and the form of privatization process to be the most impor-
tant factors inuencing FDI inow during transition (Lansbury et al. (1996) for
Central European countries). Similarly, Bevan and Estrin (2000) nd labor costs,
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the speed of reforms and political signals to signicantly a¤ect levels of FDI prior to
the EU accession. In a more recent work, Jurajda and Terrell (2009) study regional
disparities in post-communist economies and, among other issues, analyze regional
patterns of FDI inow. They nd higher FDI ows into regions with a higher initial
human capital endowment (measured as a share of college educated people at the
end of communism).
Compared to papers studying fundamental FDI determinants, literature on in-
vestment incentives and FDI promotion policies is less numerous. There is an on-
going debate about the e¤ectiveness of such policies. Some studies show that there
exists a positive albeit small e¤ect of using incentives to induce investment (Rainey
and McNamara, 1999). Other papers, however, conclude that their role is insignif-
icant and that investors location is predominantly a¤ected by primary location
factors (Guimaraes et al., 1998; Mai, 2002). Examining agglomeration e¤ects and
regional policy impact on FDI in France, Crozet et al. (2004) nd no evidence of a
positive impact of regional policies on location choices, but they nd a strong pattern
of rm clustering. However, this e¤ect fades out over time, suggesting a learning
processof foreign investors as it becomes more important to be near target markets
and less important to be a part of a cluster. On the same note, in their study of
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Guagliano and Riela (2005) analyze the
impact of industrial park designation on FDI attraction and their results show only
a weak causal link between the presence of these special zone and FDI inows.
As can be seen, the discussion about the purposefulness of investment incentives
is far from being settled. This fact is emphasized by a stream of studies claiming
the e¤ect of incentives can not be generalized and depends on the form of incentives
and its timing as well as the type and the size of the rm (Fox and Murray, 2004).
Along this line, focusing on public incentives policy in Ireland, Barrios et al. (2006)
nd a positive e¤ect of promotion policy only for low-tech rms and only during the
period when a more laissez-faireapproach to regional policy is introduced. Other
studies document that the e¤ect of public incentives on the economy is vanishing.
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Cannon (1980) analyzes the impact of incentives on employment and nds only
transitory e¤ect. Similarly, Schalk and Unitiedt (2000) claim that although the
initial impact of incentive policy on attracting new investment is initially positive,
it fails to permanently increase regional productivity and competitiveness in the
long run.
In the case of the Czech Republic, there is a dearth of rigorous empirical literature
evaluating the use of investment incentives, partly due to the initial absence of
clear and stable rules for investment incentive schemes and a time delay needed
for analyzing the impact of incentives. Valachyová (2005) marginally tackled this
issue by analyzing separately FDI determinants for the set of all rms and the
subset of rms receiving an investment incentive. The results for the infrastructure
variable and foreign rmsagglomeration remained statistically the same, thereby
implying a limited e¤ect of an investment subsidy. Nevertheless, the evidence is
not completely persuasive due to the lack of more comprehensive data capturing
the incentive scheme framework and enabling identication of a causal relationship
between FDI incentives and rm arrival. Therefore, the author admits, the results
should be interpreted with caution.
2.3 Institutional background
Foreign capital ows into the Czech Republic started in the early 1990s when the
centrally-planned economy collapsed. Initially, the governmental stance towards FDI
incentives was rather mixed. Soon, the need for foreign know-how and technology
was recognized, and systematic state support of FDI began.5
Governmental support of FDI inow started in 1998, providing foreign investors
with an option to apply for a nancial subsidy. However, the system lacked trans-
parency and a clear set of predened rules as decisions about FDI incentives, their
magnitude, and regional allocation were fully at the discretion of the government.
5The government agency CzechInvest was established in 1992 for FDI promotion and admin-
istration.
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Therefore, the system was elaborated in 2000, when a formalized scheme of invest-
ment incentives was established.6 Since then, three types of investment incentives
have been implemented: the investment incentives program for the manufactur-
ing sector (program M)7, the job creation support program for regions worst
a¤ected by unemployment (program U)8 and the framework program for the
support of technology centers and the strategic services(program F).9
A primary motivation for the adoption of the investment incentives scheme was
to diminish regional disparities, compensate distressed peripheral districts in the
Czech Republic and to increase their attractiveness to investors. This strategy was
reected by the setup of the incentive policy - with the exception of the program F,
it introduced di¤erent eligibility categories dependent on the district unemployment
rate. Based on the local unemployment rate during the previous year, districts were
split into four groups: high-incentive, medium-incentive, low-incentive and
no-incentivegroup. The rst group included districts with the local unemploy-
ment rate of at least 50 percent above the country average, districts with the local
unemployment rate 25 percent (but less than 50 percent) above the country average
were classied as medium-incentive and districts with above-average local unemploy-
ment rate (but smaller than 25 percent above the average) as low-incentive. Finally,
no-incentive group consisted of districts with the local unemployment rate below the
6An investment incentive law (no. 72/2000) became e¤ective on May 1, 2000, dening the rules
and eligibility conditions for foreign as well as domestic investors. The Czech Republic became
the rst Central or Eastern European country with a clear investment incentive system dened by
law.
7The program was the rst and the largest investment incentive program and started on May
1s 2000, providing investors into the manufacturing sector with income-tax relief, job-creation
subsidies and training and retraining subsidies after meeting certain criteria (these were notably
the minimum invested amount and the number of created vacancies see Table 2.1 for a detailed
overview of these conditions and the changes in the program).
8The program started on June 2, 2004, and ended on December 31, 2007. It was motivated
by the intention to attract foreign rms to more distressed regions of the Czech Republic. Firms
investing at least 10 mil. CZK and creating at least 10 vacancies were eligible for a nancial
support which took two forms either a direct subsidy for each created vacancy or a subsidy for
employee retraining (see Table 2.2 for more details about the program).
9Program F, which was launched on June 2, 2002 and ended on December 31, 2007, was
designed to attract R&D activities and knowledge-based investors. Technology centers have been
dened as establishments oriented towards innovation and strategic services have been specied as
manufactures with a high added-value in knowledge-intensive sectors.
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country average.10 Eligibility of individual districts was reassessed every six months
and, consequently, districtseligibility could vary over time as districts could shift
from one eligibility category to another (Table 2.3) or even become ineligible for
incentives at all (Table 2.4). Unfortunately, it is di¢ cult to identify the impact
of investment incentives on FDI in the case of districts with changing eligibility.
Therefore, in order to remove noise from the data, we limit the sample to districts
that changed eligibility category at most once during a given period.11 It should be
noted that changing categories, particularly moving to a lower subsidy category, is
in a sense an outcome of the program. However, studying the ultimate impact of
incentives on unemployment is beyond the scope of this paper as we are interested
primarily on the impact of investment incentives on FDI inow.12
Only the rst two programs are considered when evaluating the e¤ectiveness
of incentive policies due to identication issues (eligibility criteria being based on
unemployment thresholds; discussed in identication strategysection). Neverthe-
less, these two programs promoted a vast majority of supported FDI projects (more
than 97 percent), thereby justifying this approach. Another important feature is
an institutional change in the design of program M, virtually removing incentive
eligibility for the rst eligibility group (districts with above-average unemployment
rate but smaller than 20 percent above the average) starting from 2005. Therefore,
in order to reect this methodical change in the program, the eligibility thresholds
separating no- from low-incentive districts and low- from medium-incentive districts
are grouped together when estimating a simple regression model. In doing so, the
10The medium 25 percent threshold was replaced by 20 percent from 2006 (Table 2.1). Moving
from a no-incentive group to a low-incentive group made a company eligible for 80,000 CZK
(roughly 3,500 euros) subsidy per each created vacancy and a reimbursement of 25 percent of
requalication expenses. Moving from a low-incentive to a medium-incentive group increased the
direct subsidy by 50 percent to 4,750 euros and a requalication subsidy by additional 5 percentage
points of expenses. A shift from a medium-incentive to a high-incentive group increased the direct
subsidy by a 67 percent margin (to 7,000 euros) and the refund for requalication expenses increased
by another 5 percentage points (to 35 percent of total expenses overall).
11The following districts were dropped due to several changes in eligibility categories: Chrudim,
Opava, Bµreclav, Vsetín, Kromµeµríµz and Frýdek-Místek.
12For an analysis of the impact of FDI on labor market conditions, see, e.g., Dinga and Munich
(2010).
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coe¢ cient for the grouped variable represents an estimate an e¤ect of the lowest
available threshold on FDI inow. For a regression-discontinuity analysis, the insti-
tutional change in design of program Mis reected by splitting the sample into
periods 2000-2005 and 2006-2007. During the rst period the impact at all three
thresholds is inspected, while only the medium- and high-unemployment thresholds
are studied during the later period.
2.4 Methodology
Following the theoretical literature, we consider a set of traditional FDI determi-
nants, namely, human capital endowment proxied by the share of tertiary-educated
productive labor force, industrial structure of employment (the share of employment
in the manufacturing sector) and local labor costs. Another set of explanatory vari-
ables includes the share of arable land out of the total area of a district, connections
to main highways and proximity to target markets. Also, the local unemployment
rate and vacancy rate are included in the model.
The impact of human capital endowment on FDI is, ceteris paribus, expected
to be positive. Industrial structure is also expected to exhibit a positive inuence
on FDI inow due to industry-specic FDI ows (e.g., Guimaraes et al., 2000) and
the fact that the majority of inward FDI in the Czech Republic comes into the
manufacturing sector (more than 30 percent in 2006).13 Local labor costs are repre-
sented by a logarithm of average local wages. Obviously, holding other independent
variables constant, rms are expected to show a strong tendency to locate their
labor-intensive production in districts with low labor costs (Basile, 2004). How-
ever, low wages might reect unobserved low productivity of the local labor force,
therefore, high wages are expected to decrease FDI ows only if di¤erences in wages
are not outweighed by di¤erences in labor productivity.14 A variable describing the
13It is not possible to analyze FDI ows separately for di¤erent industries due to the nature of
the FDI data only aggregate values are available at the district level.
14Unfortunately, the data on labor productivity at the district-level are not available for the
Czech Republic.
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share of arable land on the total area of a district is introduced to capture investors
possible preference for agricultural land and is expected to be positive.15
In empirical literature, distance between markets implies trade costs. The prox-
imity of target markets exerts a positive inuence inward FDI, increasing with the
size of these markets and the levels of exports to these markets. In the case of
the Czech Republic, Germany and Austria are the main export markets among
neighboring countries, thereby justifying the use of a dummy indicating a common
border with these countries as an explanatory variable. This dummy is expected
to take a positive sign. On the same note, a good connection to target markets
diminishes transportation costs and, thus, a dummy indicating a connection of a
particular district to the highway network is expected to have a positive sign. The
unemployment and vacancy rates describe the tightness of the local labor market.
A high unemployment rate increases the pool of available workforce and is expected
to attract FDI inow. On the contrary, a high vacancy rate indicates the lack of
suitable workers and deters new FDI.16 The inclusion of the time trend captures
an intertemporal variation in aggregate FDI due to macroeconomic and external
factors.
The principal model is augmented by an investment incentive dummy, which
indicates the eligibility of a particular district for some form of investment incentives.
The purpose of FDI incentives is to increase the propensity of investors to locate
in areas preferred by the government and, therefore, the sign of incentive dummy is
expected to be positive.
Formally, foreign direct investment is assumed to be a function of following
variables:
FDI = f(EDUC;UNI;MANUF;AGRI;HIGHWAY;EU15; w; u; v; t; t2; INC);
(2.1)
15It is known from anecdotal evidence that building up a new plant on agricultural land (green-
eld investment) is usually cheaper than revitalizing an industrial site (brown-eld investment).
16High levels of both the unemployment and vacancy rates indicate a skill mismatch when there
is a disporportion between skills supplied by labor force and skills demanded by rms.
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where EDUC is a share of productive labor force with completed secondary educa-
tion,17 UNI is the share of tertiary educated productive labor force,MANUF is the
share of employment in the manufacturing sector, AGRI is the share of arable land,
HIGHWAY indicates the presence of a highway, EU15 stands for the common
border with the EU-15 (Austria and Germany), w stands for the local wage level,
u is the local unemployment rate, v is the local vacancy rate, t is the time trend
and INC is the set of three incentive dummies (low-incentive, medium-incentive,
high-incentive) indicating the eligibility category of a district for incentives.
In order to remove potential endogeneity of EDUC, UNI, MANUF , w, AGRI
andHIGHWAY , these variables are proxied by their initial-periodvalues. Specif-
ically, educational and industrial structure is taken for year 1997 and AGRI and
HIGHWAY for year 1996, i.e., years before massive FDI inow occurred. Explana-
tory variables constructed in this way can be considered as exogenous with respect
to future FDI inow. Unemployment and vacancy rates can also be endogenous,
leading to biased regression estimates. In order to overcome this endogeneity prob-
lem, the dependent variable FDI is constructed as a forward-looking average of
yearly FDI inows into a particular district. As a result, current FDI and vacancy
rates can be considered as predetermined.
2.5 Data
We make use of various data sources. The information about FDI ows is obtained
from the Czech National Bank and covers annual periods between 1998 and 2007
at the district level.18 Overall FDI consists of basic capital (deposit of non-resident
17By completed secondary education we mean having passed school-leaving examinations
(roughly corresponding to German Abiturexam or the U.K. General Certicate of Education)
which are held at the end of all academic secondary schools and some vocational and specialized
schools.
18FDI is dened according to OECD (1996): Capital investment abroad is regarded as a foreign
direct investment if the purpose is to establish permanent equity relation with a target company.
The share of a foreign investment must be at least 10 per cent of the target rms basic capital.
The stock of FDI in a year t is dened as a cumulative amount of FDI starting from 1989 to the
end of the particular year. Annual FDI ows are calculated on a net basis as an outcome of credit
and debit capital transactions between direct investors and their foreign a¢ liates. Hence, there
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in the form of xed assets), reinvested earnings (prot not distributed as dividends)
and other capital (loans from the parent company). Our goal is to identify the role
of nancial incentives on actual location decisions of new foreign rms. The best
indicator of FDI incoming from new establishments is basic capital, therefore, only
this part of FDI is considered for the purpose of our analysis.19 In addition, three
main metropolitan districts - Prague, Brno and Ostrava - are excluded from the
analysis as FDI for these cities is a¤ected to a large extent by factors not related
to the existence of investment incentive schemes based on unemployment thresholds
(programs M and U). These districts were the main recipients of FDI from
program F, the only program not imposing any criteria regarding the level of un-
employment. This program was aimed at supporting FDI into technology centers
and strategic services and attracted FDI almost exclusively to these metropolitan
areas due to their specic position (university centers, qualied labor force, concen-
tration of hi-tech industries). In addition, Prague, as a capital and the seat of head
o¢ ces of large nancial institutions, has been subject to substantial jumps in FDI
ows due to privatization of banks and large one-o¤ sales of state-owned enterprises.
Moreover, there exists a discrepancy between actual and reported location of FDI:
it is registered in a district where the head o¢ ce is located, biasing the statistics for
companies operating across districts. A typical example would be a large enterprise
with its head o¢ ce located in Prague that sets up a new branch in a particular
district outside Prague. In such a case, even though the incentive is spent in this
district, the new FDI is recorded in Prague. Fortunately, a list of FDI projects
supported by programs M and U contains only a negligible number of rms
operating in more than one district, thus justifying the use of district-level FDI data
for analyzing the incentive impact.
Other data sources are the Unemployment Registry (UR), the Labor Force Sur-
exists a possibility of negative FDI ow in the case of reverse investment when some component
of FDI (e.g., basic capital of the rm) decreases and this drop is not o¤set by the remaining FDI
components.
19The other two components of FDI - reinvested prot and remaining capital - are inuenced
by the internal decisions of existing rms and corresponding nancial transactions, thereby not
related to the existence of an incentive scheme.
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vey (LFS), Czech Statistical O¢ ce (CSO) and CzechInvest. The UR contains quar-
terly district-level data on unemployment and the CSO provides information on
wages and geographic characteristics. The LFS includes individual data about la-
bor market status, age, education, sector of employment and other characteristics
which serve as a basis for calculating the industry and education structure for each
district on a semi-annual basis. Investment incentives data are from the government
agency CzechInvest and the Ministry of Labor and Social A¤airs. It contains a list of
subsidized investment projects as well as a list of districts eligible for state support
during particular time periods.
The eligibility of the districts was reassessed every six months, therefore the
time unit of the analysis is a half-year. In order to obtain half-year frequency for
FDI data, we construct forward-looking averages in the following way: for the rst
half of any year, the FDI variable is calculated as the average of FDI inow during
the current year and the following year; for second half-years, the FDI variable is
calculated as the average of FDI inow during the current year and two following
years.
Sample means for the analysis-ready data are showed in Table 2.5. There is a
visible parabolic trend in FDI inow per capita which justies the use of a squared
time trend in the regression.
2.6 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the total FDI stock in the Czech Republic between
1998 and 2006. Each box characterizes a regional distribution of overall FDI stock
during a particular year on a logarithmic scale. An upward trend reveals a steady
increase in the FDI stock, the persistence of regional variation and the dominance
of Prague in FDI allocation.20 In absolute terms, while the overall stock of FDI in
20The box plot characterizes the distribution of the FDI stock the median is represented by
the white line inside the box, the quartiles by the edges of each box, the extreme values (thin lines
extending from each box) and the outlier (Prague).
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the Czech Republic was 429.2 billion CZK (roughly 17.5 billion euros) at the end
of 1998, by the end of 2006 it was 1,667 billion CZK (67 billion euros). Thereof,
approximately one half of overall FDI stock in the Czech Republic is located in the
capital city of Prague. This disproportion is even magnied if per capita levels are
considered. Table 2.6 displays FDI inows per capita for the three largest cities
(Prague, Brno and Ostrava) as compared with the rest of the Czech Republic. The
specic position of these metropolitan districts is documented by large regional
disparities in FDI ows between them and the rest of the country, thereby justifying
their exclusion from the analysis as described in the previous section.
In assessing the impact of the incentive scheme, it is important to realize di¤er-
ences in the unemployment rate both geographically and intertemporally. In Table
2.7 we see the evolution of the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic over time.
It can be observed that the unemployment rate increased substantially in Ústecký
and Moravskoslezský regions after the recession in the 1990s and has remained at
high levels ever since. Hence, districts in those two regions were favored by the de-
sign of the incentive scheme as foreign investors locating there had an opportunity
to obtain the most generous subsidy from the state.
Looking at the regional dimension of FDI, Table 2.8 displays an FDI inow
across regions during 2000-2007 and compares overall realized FDI inow with the
supported FDI inow and direct investment subsidy. Two main characteristics can
be observed from the table: rst, a majority of new investment projects in the Czech
Republic during 1999-2006 was supported by the state; second, for some regions
the size of supported projects exceeds the realized FDI inow. This observation
can be attributed to the delay in the realization of the project awarded with a
nancial subsidy (towards the end of the time span 2000-2007, supported FDI
may include also some projects which are yet to be realized and, thus, not included
in the realized FDIdata). Another explanation may be the discrepancy between
the planned and realized investment as the amount of supported FDI is based on the
data reported by the rm upon ling an application for investment incentive (i.e.,
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prior to the realization of the investment) and may overstate the actual amount of
realized FDI.21
FDI inow per capita by the districtseligibility for the nancial subsidy after the
implementation of the incentive scheme is shown in Table 2.9. One can observe that
the basic capital part of FDI inow is decreasing over time among eligible districts
(with the exception of the high-incentivesgroup where there is no visible trend).
However, such a simple comparison is not enough for evaluating the causal impact
of the incentive scheme. In the following section we present a rigorous identication
strategy utilizing the regression-discontinuity setup and the role of unobservables in
such a design.
2.7 Identication strategy
The identication strategy is based on a strict unemployment threshold set by
the Czech government which splits districts into several eligibility groups. Being
set exogenously, this threshold provides an opportunity to employ the regression-
discontinuity method (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) which
is designed to estimate the policy impact in the absence of a randomized controlled
experiment. We assess the e¤ectiveness of the incentive programs based on unem-
ployment thresholds by analyzing the impact of the discontinuity in an assignment
variable (the unemployment rate) on the outcome variable (the average FDI per
capita in a district during three years following the year essential for eligibility cri-
terion).
The main assumption justifying the use of RD design is that the assignment
variable is observed and the assignment rule is ex-ante known (sharp RD design).
By the setup of the investment incentive scheme, this assumption is satised. A key
assumption, which we test statistically, is that there should be no discontinuities for
21The law n. 72/2000 about investment incentives species that the investor must maintain
created jobs for at least 5 years and the investment must also contain non-public resources (at
least 25 percent).
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control variables. Another assumption is that the outcome variable is a continuous
and smooth function of the assignment variable in the absence of the treatment.
While there exists no statistical way to test this assumption, the inspection of the
outcome variable and the assignment variable prior to implementing the incentive
scheme suggests that the RD approach is justied.
In the rst step, we estimate a regression model characterized by equation (2.1),
explaining the variation in FDI caused by observables:
FDIit = + 1EDUCit + 2UNIit + 3MANUFit + 4AGRIit + 5HIGHWAYit +
+6EU15it + 7 ln(w)it + 8uit + 9vit + 1(LOWINCit +MEDINCit) +
+2(HIGHINCit) + t+ t
2 + it; (2.2)
where FDIit is a three-year average basic capital inow per capita in district i
starting in period t; explanatory variables are as described in the model and it is
a noise term. Dummies LOWINC and MEDINC are grouped in order to reect
the institutional change which occurred at the end of 2004, allowing us to identify
the impact of receiving at-least some subsidyduring the whole analyzed period.
Unfortunately, while shedding some light on the importance of time-invariant
explanatory variables such as the initial level of the share of tertiary-educated people
or manufacturing employment, a regression estimation (2.2) can potentially lead to
biased estimates of the incentive dummies as it explains only the part of the variation
in FDI caused by observables. However, the error term encompassing the variation
caused by unobservables is not generally uncorrelated with the incentive dummy
(that would be the case if the program eligibility was given randomly):
E(INV 0) 6= 0: (2.3)
In the second step, therefore, we augment equation (2.2) by district-level xed
e¤ects. In this way, we remove the variation caused by unobserved heterogeneity
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(as well as time-invariant variables). The coe¢ cients for incentive dummies from
xed-e¤ects specication can serve as a benchmark for comparison with regression-
discontinuity estimates which are obtained afterwards.
In the third step, we make use of the discontinuity design of the investment
incentive scheme and employ a key regression-discontinuity assumption claiming
that unobserved heterogeneity vanishes around the discontinuity points:
E(INV 0) = 0, for subset of districts around cut-o¤ point. (2.4)
In other words, when considering only a subset of observations around the disconti-
nuity points, the whole variation in FDI can be attributed to observables. Filtering
out the variation caused by observables minus incentive dummies, all remaining
di¤erence in the dependent variable FDI can be attributed to changes in the in-
vestment dummies.
The regression-discontinuity estimation is performed by calculating two local
linear regressions at both sides of the cuto¤ point. The di¤erence in outcome pre-
dictions between these two regressions represents the impact of the program at
the specied threshold.22 The size of the discontinuity jump is analyzed for all
three thresholds and for periods 2000-2004 and 2005-2007, reecting an institutional
change in the scheme design (starting from 2005, the medium threshold actually be-
came the lowest eligibility threshold). Standard errors of the estimates are obtained
by the bootstrapping technique.23
Two alternative estimates of the policy impact are presented. First, all districts
are included in the RD estimation. As a robustness check, the analysis is performed
on a subsample containing only districts which have experienced at most one switch
between four eligibility categories. We report only estimates of the latter speci-
22The estimation is performed in Stata, making use of the command rd (Nichols, 2007). Various
techniques are available for choosing the bandwidth and kernel. We adopt a triangle kernel and
the default bandwidth so that it includes at least 30 observations on both sides of the boundary.
23Bootstrapping corrects underestimated standard errors. Conventional standard errors may be
biased when the treatment variable rarely changes over time (Bertrand et al., 2004).
70
Chapter 2: The Role of Investment Incentives in Regional FDI Reallocation
cation as using the subsample is more plausible for the purpose of our analysis.24
Another check of the robustness of the ndings is done by using alternative band-
widths around discontinuity points.
2.8 Results
The inuence of the initial labor market conditions on FDI inow is analyzed by
running pooled OLS equation (2.2). Table 2.10 reports the coe¢ cients of explana-
tory variables characterizing wages, educational and industry structure from the
mid-1990s, as well as incentive dummies. While the signs of variables capturing
educational and industry structure are positive as expected, the nding that high
local wages seem to attract FDI inow are somewhat puzzling. However, it should
be re-emphasized that high wages might reect not only high labor unit costs, but
also high productivity.
In order to describe the change in the role of explanatory variables before and
after the introduction of the investment scheme, we estimated the regression sep-
arately for two periods: the rst includes years prior to the establishment of the
formal FDI promotion scheme (1999-2002), the second one covers the years after
the launch of all FDI incentive programs (2003-2007). It can be observed that
during years without systematic state support, an increase in the tertiary-educated
workforce by 1 percentage point increased the annual FDI inow by almost 25 eu-
ros per capita. The magnitude and signicance of this e¤ect vanishes during years
2003-2007. Similarly, investors were initially inclined toward locations with higher
wages (increasing annual FDI inow by almost 12 euros per capita); this e¤ect is
suppressed during later years. Incentive dummies show no signicance in this sim-
ple specication. However, after removing unobserved heterogeneity by including
district-level xed e¤ects, there is a positive impact on FDI for the lowest threshold
24As noted before, numerous shifts hinder a proper causal assessment of the schemes impact on
FDI and may distort the estimates since the dependent variable is calculated as a forward-looking
average of FDI inows.
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during both periods (Table 2.11). This result suggests the presence of a positive
e¤ect of the incentive scheme.
Rening the analysis, we perform a regression-discontinuity estimation. We in-
spect the impact of each eligibility category on all three thresholds by exploiting
the respective discontinuities. It is necessary to split the time span into two parts
in order to reect the launch of the program Fand a signicant change of the
parameters of the program Mat the end of 2004 (Table 2.1). Periods 2000-2004
and 2005-2007 are, therefore, analyzed separately. Table 2.12 displays regression-
discontinuity estimates based on three unemployment thresholds. The rst three
columns show the impact of the incentive scheme on FDI inow for the period be-
fore 2005 and the next three columns report estimates of the impact of the scheme
for the period 2005-2007. It can be observed that during the period 2000-2004, there
is no signicant impact of the incentive scheme at any threshold with the exception
of the rst threshold (the average unemployment), where using a short bandwidth
indicates some positive e¤ect of investment incentive on FDI inow. This nding
may be explained by the fact that the incremental value of a subsidy at the rst
threshold is twice as much as at the second threshold (80,000 CZK vs. 40,000 CZK
per created vacancy and 25 percent vs. 5 percent of retraining expenses).
In accordance with the institutional setup (the rst eligibility category was re-
moved starting from 2005), there is no signicant e¤ect of the incentive scheme at
this threshold during 2005-2007. However, contrary to the period 2000-2004, the
medium threshold displays a signicant e¤ect in the later period, increasing annual
FDI inow per capita by 328 euros. This corresponds to the mentioned change in
the design: the medium threshold has become, in fact, the lowest threshold during
the period 2005-2007 and may have absorbed the rst-threshold e¤ect on FDI
inow.
Estimates for the highest threshold exhibit a large variation depending on the
bandwidth and, thus, no clear conclusion can be made about its impact on investors
choice of location. Moreover, in the case of this threshold, one of the labor market
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characteristics (vacancy rate) does not pass the test of being continuous around the
threshold, which might a¤ect the estimates for FDI inow.
A visual presentation of the regression-discontinuity estimates helps to illustrate
the ndings: Figure 2.4 displays the impact of the incentive scheme on FDI per
capita inow for the lowest threshold. A signicant e¤ect is found only for years
2000-2004. Starting in 2005, the impact disappears in accordance with the removal
of the eligibility for the rst threshold by an institutional intervention. Correspond-
ingly, Figure 2.5 shows that although there is no signicant e¤ect for the medium-
unemployment threshold before 2005, there is a substantial impact on FDI inow
starting from 2005. In fact, this is now the lowest eligibility category and the e¤ect
is even more pronounced than in the case of the rst threshold before 2005. Figure
2.6, illustrating the impact for the highest threshold, shows no prevailing trend in
FDI inow, as the estimation is a¤ected by a smaller number of observations and
the estimates of the discontinuity impact are insignicant for both periods.
Overall, the results suggest that investment incentives have some potential in
relocating FDI. The ndings document a positive impact of investment incentives
particularly for the threshold splitting districts between ineligibility and at-least
someeligibility categories. However, there is no evidence of any added value (in
terms of increased FDI inow) of the di¤erent scales of eligibilities districts with
more generous subsidies display no extra FDI inow than districts with less generous
investment subsidies. It seems that an option to obtain an investment subsidy played
some role in foreign investorsallocation; however, they did not care that much about
the amount of the subsidy. This interpretation suggests the extra money spent on
increased subsidies for more generous categories were used ine¢ ciently.
This notion leads us to important policy questions: Is it worth spending public
money on these policies? Or are there alternative tools of policymaking which could
use public funding more e¢ ciently? While a comprehensive answer to this question
is beyond the scope of this paper, we partially answer it by roughly calculating the
net employment e¤ect of FDI subsidies. In a study of FDI employment e¤ect by
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Dinga and Münich (2010), the net employment e¤ect of a large and concentrated
district-level FDI inow in the Czech Republic is found to be 3.7 percent; however,
their result regards the specic case of a 700 million euro project and a district
of 68,000 residents. Combining that case with this papers nding that eligibility
for the incentive program increases FDI per capita by 320 euros annually (1,000
euros during three years following the eligibility decision), we assume 68 million
euros of FDI inow into this benchmark district over three years. Further, assuming
that the employment e¤ect is proportional to the size of the investment gives us an
employment impact of 240 jobs due to the investment scheme.25
Extending this back-of-the-envelope analysis to some scal implications, we as-
sume that all 240 jobs are lled with unemployed people. In other words, we do not
take into account potential crowding-out across districts and across jobs and pre-
sume budget savings are as high as yearly state costs for 240 unemployed. According
to Elbona (2005), annual expense on 240 unemployed including direct unemploy-
ment benets, taxes and social insurance contributions equals 42 million CZK. In
comparison, for an investor with 240 job openings, the incentive scheme granted a
subsidy of 19 million CZK (rst eligibility group) to 48 million CZK (third eligibility
group), suggesting that the use of investment incentives is a reasonable option from
a policymakers perspective (at least for the rst threshold).
This is only a rough approximation illustrating the magnitude of the employment
e¤ect of FDI promotion incentives. The return and the pay-o¤ time of investment
incentives depends on the proportion of the crowding-out e¤ect assuming that all
regionally reallocated FDI was attracted to the country just by the incentive scheme
itself, the pay-o¤ time would be 6 months and 14 months for the third eligibility
group. If one half of the FDI would have come to the country in the absence of the
investment incentive scheme anyway (i.e., there has been crowding-out across dis-
tricts), the pay-o¤ time would be twice as much. According to investment incentive
25We assume that a 700 million euro investment attracts 2,500 individuals (3.7 percent x pro-
ductive labor force 68,000) and a 68 million euro investment attracts roughly 240 individuals (68
mil. / (700 mil. / 2,500)).
74
Chapter 2: The Role of Investment Incentives in Regional FDI Reallocation
law 72/2000, the investor is required to maintain the created job for at least ve
years after the investment occurs. If this condition is satised, the net return on
the investment incentives would be positive as long as at least 20 percent of real-
located FDI was not crowded-out from other regions. However, this interpretation
should be taken with caution as there were cases of supported companies which were
not able to maintain the initial workforce due to the economic crisis.26 Moreover,
government-driven policies did not work for the most distressed regions as there
was no signicant e¤ect of the investment incentive for the third unemployment
threshold.
2.9 Conclusion
This research has the ambition to unveil a source of regional disparities in FDI distri-
bution in the Czech Republic and to identify main location determinants of foreign
investors during 2001-2007. The emphasis is put on the role of investment incentives
on regional allocation of FDI, as softening regional disparities and fostering new job
creation in areas with above-average unemployment can bring substantial relief for
public spending in terms of unemployment benets and social assistance. Quanti-
fying the impact of nancial incentives on foreign investorslocation decisions can
uncover the true e¤ect of these policies and shed more light on the justication of
investment incentives.
The design of the investment incentive scheme in the Czech Republic allows the
identication strategy to be based on di¤erences around the cuto¤ discontinuity
points. The identication is based on a regression-discontinuity estimation around
three thresholds, classifying districts into three eligibility and one ineligibility cate-
gories. We estimate the impact of each threshold in FDI district-level reallocation
across the Czech Republic. In other words, we only measure the policy impact on
26An infamous example of such a problematic investment project is represented by LG.Phillips
in district Pµrerov. The company was not able to maintain the number of job openings as specied
in the investment subsidy contract and eventually stopped production due to insolvency four years
after the start of production.
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redistribution of FDI already attracted to the country (at the international level,
FDI may be attracted by country-level variables; Bevan and Estrin, 2000).
During the period before 2004, regression-discontinuity estimates are positive
and both economically and statistically signicant only for the rst threshold (the
average unemployment rate) and smaller bandwidth, and the positive e¤ect van-
ishes at the second threshold (1.25 x the average unemployment rate) and the third
threshold (1.5 x the average unemployment rate). After the change in the institu-
tional setup in 2004, implementing stricter unemployment conditions and removing
the rst eligibility category, there is a positive impact of the second threshold on FDI
inow, increasing annual FDI inow per capita by 320 euros. Since this threshold
became virtually the lowest unemployment threshold after 2004, it can be concluded
that there is a positive impact of investment subsidies only for the lowest available
unemployment threshold during the whole period. This ndings is supported by the
lack of the discontinuity impact for the medium threshold during 2001-2004 and for
the lowest threshold during 2005-2007, respectively. The results provide no evidence
of the signicance of the incentive e¤ect for the third threshold.
Overall, investors were initially inclined towards locations with educated work-
force and relatively higher wages as rise in the share of tertiary-educated labor force
by a percentage point increases the annual FDI inow per capita signicantly by 25
euros per capita during 2001-2004. Afterwards, the composition and determinants
of FDI were altered and incentive variables became crucial factors in FDI attraction.
Performing a back-of-the-envelope calculation and comparing the costs of invest-
ment incentives with the benets from saved costs on unemployment benets, we
argue that the adoption of the investment incentive scheme in the Czech Republic
exhibits a positive net e¤ect for the lowest unemployment threshold. While such
approximations should be taken with caution, it gives the idea of the e¢ ciency of
investment subsidies. Summarizing, attraction of FDI can be e¢ ciently supported
from the state budget, with the exception of districts with the highest unemploy-
ment rate. Attracting FDI into the most distressed regions, thus, remains one of
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the important challenges for policymakers.
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2.11 Appendix
Figure 2.1: Overall stock of FDI in transition countries and Germany
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Figure 2.2: FDI inow in transition countries and Germany
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Figure 2.3: Realized stock of FDI across Czech regions (logarithms)
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Figure 2.4: Regression discontinuity at the rst threshold (low)
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Figure 2.5: Regression discontinuity at the second threshold (medium)
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Figure 2.6: Regression discontinuity at the third threshold (high)
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Table 2.3: The list of districts eligible for investment incentives for the whole
period
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sokolov L M M M M M M M
Dµeµcín H H H H H H H H
Chomutov H H H H H H H H
Litomµeµrice M M M M M M M M
Louny H H H H H H M H
Most H H H H H H H H
Teplice H H H H H H H H
Ústí nad Labem H H H H H M H H
Svitavy M M M M M M M M
Hodonín H H H H H H H H
Tµrebíµc M M M M M M M M
Znojmo M M M M M M H H
Bruntál H H H H H H H H
Frýdek-Místek H H H H M H M M
Karviná H H H H H H H H
Nový Jiµcín M M M M M M M H
Pµrerov H H H H M M M M
umperk M M M M M M M M
Jeseník H H H H H H H H
Note: H stands for district with the unemployment rate above 1.5*U_avg, M for districts with
the unemployment rate between 1.25*U_avg and 1.5*U_avg and L for districts with the unem-
ployment rate between U and 1.25*U_avg.
Table 2.4: The list of districts eligible for investment incentives only during some
periods
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Kladno L L L L L
Kolín L L L L L
Bµreclav L L L L L M M
Kromµeµríµz L L L L L M M
Vsetín L L L L L M M
Kutná Hora M M M M M
Nymburk L L L
Opava M M M M L M M
Olomouc M M M M L
Karlovy Vary L L L
µCeská Lípa L
Liberec L
Chrudim L L L
Prostµejov L L L L
Vykov L L L L L
Note: H stands for district with the unemployment rate above 1.5*U_avg, M for districts with
the unemployment rate between 1.25*U_avg and 1.5*U_avg and L for districts with the unem-
ployment rate between U and 1.25*U_avg. Staring from 2005, category L was abandoned as there
remained only eligibility categories M and H.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics: the Czech Republic (means)
Year FDI EDUC UNI MANUF AGRI ln(w) HIGHWAY EU15 u_rate v_rate
1998 306.4 78.9 6.26 30.7 39.5 9.27 0.24 0.26 6.87 1.11
1999 320.0 79.5 6.34 31.0 39.4 9.35 0.24 0.26 9.09 0.84
2000 269.6 78.5 6.57 30.9 39.3 9.41 0.24 0.26 8.75 1.18
2001 127.3 78.5 6.82 31.4 39.2 9.47 0.26 0.26 8.48 1.28
2002 97.6 80.0 7.29 31.2 39.1 9.53 0.26 0.26 9.28 0.95
2003 111.3 80.1 7.43 30.6 39.0 9.60 0.26 0.26 9.96 0.85
2004 219.9 81.1 7.72 30.6 38.9 9.66 0.30 0.26 10.08 0.89
2005 330.6 82.1 8.28 31.7 38.8 9.71 0.31 0.26 9.49 0.98
2006 329.2 82.4 8.71 32.3 38.7 9.75 0.34 0.26 8.46 1.65
2007 362.4 82.0 8.90 32.9 38.6 9.79 0.35 0.26 6.82 2.37
Note: FDI is the forward-looking three-year average of basic capital inow per capita in Euros,
EDUC is the share of productive labor force with completed secondary education, UNI is the share
of tertiary educated productive labor force, MANUF is the share of employment in manufacturing
sector, AGRI is the share of arable land, HIGHWAY indicates the presence of a highway and EU15
stands for the common border with the EU-15 (Austria and Germany).
Table 2.6: Average FDI per capita inow in the Czech Republic (euros)
Year Czech Republic 3 largest Rest
1999 320.0 1,099.4 144.2
2000 269.6 1,016.2 102.0
2001 127.3 362.1 75.5
2002 97.6 212.9 72.0
2003 111.3 332.1 62.4
2004 219.9 1,085.2 28.9
2005 330.6 1,419.8 89.6
2006 329.2 1,305.7 113.1
Note: For the calculation of average FDI per capita inow the three years following the year pivotal
for eligibility decision were considered. The three largest cities are represented by the metropolitan
areas of Prague, Brno and Ostrava.
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Table 2.7: Unemployment rate in Czech regions over time (% of labor force)
1995 1999 2003 2007
Prague 0.3 3.2 3.9 2.8
Central Bohemia 2.7 6.9 7.2 5.4
Pardubický 2.7 8.1 8.7 6.8
Královehradecký 2.1 6.9 10.2 5.6
Liberecký 2.3 7.7 9.2 7.4
Ústecký 5.8 14.7 17.4 14.0
Karlovarský 1.8 8.1 10.2 9.3
Plzeµnský 2.3 6.9 7.3 5.6
South Bohemia 2.0 6.2 6.4 5.8
Zlínský 2.7 8.1 10.3 8.0
Vysoµcina 3.6 8.4 8.6 7.1
South Moravia 3.0 9.0 11.1 8.9
Olomoucký 4.6 11.4 12.0 9.0
Moravskoslezský 5.7 13.5 16.4 12.9
Czech Republic 3.1 8.6 10.0 7.8
Note: Regional unemployment rates for years 1995, 1999 and 2003 were calculated by merging
together districts corresponding to a particular region according to the structural division as of
2007 (there was a change in regional structure starting June 2004).
Table 2.8: FDI inow, supported FDI and investment incentives during 2000-2007
(mil. CZK) Realized FDI Supported FDI Paid incentives
Central Bohemia 157,888 61,475 761
South Bohemia 47,552 16,096 5
Plzeµnský 32,756 15,879 18
Karlovarský 5,129 6,860 45
Ústecký 52,848 62,725 2,455
Liberecký 39,630 20,952 6
Královehradecký 17,474 13,408 11
Pardubický 18,798 21,550 11
Vysoµcina 57,035 27,844 55
South Moravia 45,374 26,544 540
Olomoucký 10,846 23,792 1,090
Zlínský 31,627 10,616 25
Moravskoslezský 139,389 28,147 1,360
Czech Republic 656,346 343,815 6,382
Note: Realized FDI is the actual FDI inow during 2000-2007, supported FDI stands for the
overall amount of planned investment (lled in the application for investment incentive) and paid
incentives is the sum of total nancial state subsidy during the period. The regions with the
largest share of paid incentives are Central Bohemia region (TPCA investment - 593 mil. CZK),
Ústecký region (Black & Decker Overseas Holdings BV - 200 mil. CZK; IPS Alpha Technology -
140 mil. CZK; Eaton Industries - 130 mil. CZK), Olomoucký region (L.G. Phillips - 800 mil. CZK)
and Moravskoslezský region (ASUS - 271,4 mil; Sungwoo Hitech - 150 mil. CZK). There was no
individual company with more than 100 mil. CZK subsidy in the remaining regions. Prague is
excluded.
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Table 2.10: Pooled OLS estimation: explaining FDI inow by observables
coef. st.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
1998-2007 1998-2002 2003-2007
SECONDARY 2.18 (6.00) 0.01 (3.34) 6.08 (11.63)
TERTIARY 12.34 (8.82) 24.51 (9.28) -4.26 (14.44)
MANUF 1.95 (2.31) 2.65 (3.07) 0.87 (3.76)
AGRI 1.24 (0.94) 0.55 (1.32) 1.49 (1.15)
HIGHWAY 55.69 (52.81) 23.00 (33.86) 79.58 (93.40)
EU15 62.29 (42.82) 29.11 (37.57) 99.81 (67.99)
log(WAGE) 693.99 (388.77) 1174.53 (346.23) 183.45 (589.85)
u_rate -6.31 (9.29) -7.30 (9.22) -17.43 (12.74)
v_rate 8.71 (80.72) -24.51 (51.38) 49.39 (98.35)
u x v 0.24 (11.61) 5.12 (6.85) -2.32 (15.43)
LOW+MEDIUM -2.36 (46.6) 32.25 (46.57) 39.31 (71.98)
HIGH 34.20 (73.15) 12.56 (90.91) 175.44 (123.21)
N 1480 740 740
R-squared 0.06 0.16 0.04
Note: Pooled linear regression explaining heterogeneity in FDI inow per capita based on pooled
data. The regression is estimated for two periods: the rst includes years prior to the establishment
of the formal FDI promotion scheme (1999-2002), the second one covers the years after the launch
of all FDI incentive programs (2003-2007). The dependent variable is the forward-looking average
of FDI inow. The following independent variables are time-invariant and characterize levels
prior to the massive FDI inow: variable SECONDARY indicates the share of population with
secondary education and TERTIARY the share of college-educated population; MANUF stands for
the employment share in the manufacturing sector, AGRI indicates the share of agricultural land
out of the total area of a district and HIGHWAY is a dummy indicating the presence of a state
highway. Dummy EU15 indicates a border with Austria or Germany, u_rate is the unemployment
rate and v_rate is the vacancy rate. Cities of Prague, Brno and Ostrava are excluded. Time trend
coe¢ cients and intercept are not displayed. Standard errors allow for intragroup correlation by
clustering observations by district. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %, * 10%.
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Table 2.11: Fixed-e¤ects estimation: the role of incentives in FDI attraction
coef. st.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
1998-2007 1998-2002 2003-2007
u_rate 6.60 (13.84) -6.76 (12.39) 10.53 (20.52)
v_rate -27.63 (93.59) -74.84 (92.79) 1.29 (82.77)
u x v 5.81 (10.93) 10.93 (12.21) 5.71 (15.02)
LOW+MEDIUM 57.40 (52.42) 77.213 (45.93) 165.16 (98.91)
HIGH -27.44 (103.27) -17.50 (116.85) 137.83 (124.73)
N 1480 740 740
R-sq. (between) 0.07 0.03 0.04
Note: Fixed-e¤ects estimation explaining heterogeneity in FDI inow per capita based on pooled
data. The regression is estimated for two periods: the rst includes years prior to the establishment
of the formal FDI promotion scheme (1999-2002), the second one covers the years after the launch
of all FDI incentive programs (2003-2007). The dependent variable is the forward-looking average
of FDI inow. Variable u_rate stands for the unemployment rate and v_rate is the vacancy rate.
Dummy HIGH indicates the group of districts with the highest subsidy and the grouped variable
LOW+MEDIUM indicates the eligibility for the lowest subsidy. Cities of Prague, Brno and Ostrava
are excluded. Time trend coe¢ cients and intercept are not displayed. Standard errors allow for
intragroup correlation by clustering observations by district. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %,
* 10%.
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Chapter 3
The E¤ect of Economic and
Monetary Integration on FDI: The
European Experience
(Joint work with Vilma Dingova)
3.1 Introduction
In 1999, the euro was introduced as a common currency in eleven countries of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU). The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU), or
formally the euro area, was viewed as a necessary step towards closer political and
economic integration. From the political perspective, the common currency was
expected to become a unifying symbol of European identity. From the economic
perspective, the common currency was supposed to enhance the free movement of
capital, which is a fundamental principle of the EU. At the same time, it would
promote trade through diminishing transaction costs and trade costs such as ex-
change rate volatility (Rose, 1999). In a broader context, the common currency was
believed to ensure better functioning of an integrated market (Delors, 1989).
The euro project has been generally supported by policymakers and politicians.
Expectations about the economic gains of the common currency were ambitious and
An earlier version of this work has been published as IES Working Paper 25/2011.
All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the author.
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several waves of enlargement took place over the last decade (Table 3.1).1 Never-
theless, eurosceptics objected that one currency does not t the monetary needs of
diverse economies and the initial weak growth of the euro area fueled their argu-
ments. Among academics, the decision to form a common currency area led to a
considerable research interest. The literature ranged from assessing the fulllment
of Mundell-McKinnon-Kenen criteria and evaluating arguments in favor and against
a currency union (e.g. Giavazzi and Torres, 1993) to comparing the co-movements
in macroeconomic variables between the EU and the USA and analyzing their asym-
metric shocks (e.g. Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993).
The debate on the contribution of a common currency to economic development
is vital. In our paper, we contribute to the mosaic of impacts of a common currency
on the economy by investigating one specic aspect of a common currency: the link
between the introduction of the euro and the inow of foreign direct investment
(FDI). Two main research questions regarding the euro and FDI are asked: rst,
has the common currency enhanced FDI ows for countries that adopted the euro
as compared with the rest of the OECD countries and, second, has the euro fostered
capital reallocation for euro countries as compared with the rest of the EU? In
addition, the role of both economic and monetary integration is examined and the
impact of introducing the euro is compared with the impact of EU membership.
The euro exerts an inuence on many economic activities, one of them being
the ow of capital among countries resulting from the removal of restrictions on
investment location decisions (Baldwin et al., 2008). It is important to understand
rms international strategies as FDI is associated with higher economic growth,
developed technologies and knowledge spillovers among countries (Harris and Taylor,
2005). The literature has shown that uncertainty negatively a¤ects investment and,
more specically, that uncertainty about exchange rate movement has an adverse
e¤ect on FDI decisions (Carruth et al., 2000). In particular, a persistent deviation
1Greece joined the club in 2001. The EMU was later enlarged by Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus
and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, and the newest euro area member is Estonia which joined the
EMU in 2011. Thus, 17 of 27 EU countries now use the euro as an o¢ cial currency.
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of the exchange rate from the long-run equilibrium negatively a¤ects FDI ows
(Campa, 1993). Thus, it is natural to ask whether the elimination of exchange rate
movements resulting from the introduction of a common currency inuences rms´
long-term investment decisions and FDI in general.
The common currency can a¤ect FDI inows through three channels: reduced ex-
change rate uncertainty, reduced transaction costs, and increased price transparency.
First, the elimination of exchange rate risk leads to cost saving stemming from the
absence of a need for hedging, thereby positively a¤ecting expected returns to rms.
Many multinational enterprises (MNEs) are export-oriented and FDI serves mainly
as a production platform for their exports (Bergstrand and Egger, 2006). Naturally,
a motivation of MNEs to locate their operations in the EMU increases as foreign
investors expansion into the euro area opens access to the rest of the euro area
countries and to the surrounding EU market. Secondly, the reduction of transaction
and operational costs incurred by the use of several currencies reduces the cost of
capital. Thirdly, the common currency enhances price transparency, facilitating a
comparison of factor prices and cost calculations. Many investments abroad are
motivated by rmse¤orts to produce e¢ ciently and the endowment and prices of
primary factors of production land, labor and capital are important determinants
of rmslocalization decisions.
Determining the euros impact on capital reallocation through FDI would have
broad policy implications. Apart from traditional location determinants (infrastruc-
ture, human capital), countries use various institutional factors to attract FDI.
Specically, governments spend vast amounts of public money on FDI promotion
policies and investment incentive schemes. Thus, quantifying the impact of the euro
on FDI ows might become a considered factor for EU countries that have not yet
adopted the euro..
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze
global FDI ows and the role of FDI in the EU. In Section 3 we review related
literature. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to methodology issues and data description,
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and Section 6 presents the identication strategy. In Section 7 we present our results
and robustness checks. Section 8 summarizes and provides concluding remarks. All
tables referenced in the text may be found in the appendix.
3.2 FDI in the EU
Global FDI ows have grown dramatically over the past three decades, increasing
from $54 billion in 1980 to $1,771 billion in 2008. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
there was an evident increasing trend in FDI to developing countries as productive
factors were emphasized as one of the most important motivations for FDI.2 These
countries capitalized on the advantage of lower productive costs, mainly labor costs,
and their share in global FDI ows rose from 14 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in
2008, as shown in Table 3.2. There is a dip in world FDI ows starting in 2001,
which is related to the slowdown in the world economy and to a decline in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. After recovering during 2004-2007, there was a
more recent decline in 2008, mainly due to the imminent economic and nancial
crisis. However, the overall share of FDI ows to developing countries has remained
signicantly lower than the share of ows to developed economies (37 vs. 57 percent
in 2008).
Europe absorbs about two thirds of total FDI inows to developed economies,
followed by North America with a share of 26 percent (Table 3.3). Besides being
the main recipient of world FDI ows, Europe is also a main source of these ows,
followed by the United States and Japan. Disentangling FDI ows further, approx-
imately 96 percent of ows into Europe are aimed at the EU and more than 66
percent at the EMU. From 1995, FDI inows to Europe have increased, with an ex-
ception in the periods 2001-2004 and 2008-2009 when the world FDI ows decreased
due to the nancial and economic crisis. However, it has remained the prevalent
global recipient of FDI ows.
2Locating a rms activities to countries with the lowest production costs leads to vertical FDI.
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FDI is believed to promote economic growth and development (Tondl and Vuksic,
2003); therefore, understanding the mechanism of FDI location should be a key focus
of responsible policymaking. In the case of developed economies, FDI spillovers
through managerial expertise are a dominant factor (Ghosh and Wang, 2009). The
common euro area, a single market with more than 300 million consumers, attracts
FDI by its enormous size, economic power and no exchange rate risk. Furthermore,
it serves as a production platform for exports, which is an important decision aspect
for investors from outside the EU. From a country-level point of view, joining the
common currency area diminishes currency volatility and transaction costs.3 This
feature is especially important for countries with a substantial share of export-
oriented rms such as the Czech Republic or other Central and Eastern European
countries.
3.3 Literature survey
The rapid growth of investment ows in the globalized world economy over the last
decades has sparked academic interest in FDI determinants and the FDI e¤ects on
both host and home economies. The empirical literature acknowledges that foreign
investors location decisions are inuenced by rm-level factors as well as macro-
economic, geographic and institutional variables. One strand of literature on FDI
determinants arises from the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1997), also known as the
OLI model.4 Based on the new trade theory, this model emphasizes ownership and
location advantages and analyzes FDI from the investors´ point of view. Investors
decisions whether to become a multinational enterprise is examined mainly through
rm costs represented as plant-level costs and trade costs (Markusen and Venables,
1998; Kleinert 2001). Another strand of literature looks at determinants of FDI
3Increasing market size of the euro area strengthens its economic power. Moreover, the two
largest EU markets - Germany and France - are member states of the euro area.
4The OLI model is based on three categories of advantages of foreign investment: O Own-
ership advantage (trademark, entrepreneurial skills, etc.), L Location advantage (access to raw
materials, prices of production factors, etc.), I Internalization advantage (licensing, joint venture,
etc.).
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location from the perspective of country di¤erences, attempting to identify how
country-level factors such as size, institutions, taxes, exchange rate, trade protec-
tion, production factor prices and human capital endowment a¤ect FDI ows.5
Literature focusing on the e¤ect of exchange rate on FDI has two branches, one
examining the relation between exchange rate levels and international investment
ows and the second focusing on exchange rate volatility and the role of uncertainty
and expectations about the future exchange rate. Studies based on the rm-level
framework and option theory nd that greater exchange rate uncertainty increases
the outside option for rms so that it pays o¤ to delay their investment, which
depresses current FDI (Dixit and Pindyck, 2004).6
Since the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), analysis of the
role of exchange rate uncertainty on FDI ows has been supplemented by the aspect
of common currency and its impact on investment ows. The literature studying
the link between the euro and FDI nds a signicant positive impact of the euro
on FDI (Petroulas, 2007; Schiavo, 2007; De Sousa and Lochard, 2006; Buch et al.,
2003). However, there is no consensus regarding the size of the e¤ect, and thus the
exact magnitude of the impact of the euro on FDI remains unclear.
Baldwin et al. (2008) highlight that the usual shortcoming preventing a proper
estimation of the euro e¤ect on FDI is a less-developed methodology and identi-
cation strategy. In our paper, we use a rigorous identication technique to obtain
more reliable estimates of the common currency impact on international investment.
The standard approach to analyzing the impact of the euro on FDI employs a
gravity model augmented with a dummy variable for a common currency. De Sousa
and Lochard (2006) investigate the FDI decision of a rm to set up an a¢ liate
abroad and estimate the e¤ect of the euro on FDI for 21 OECD countries. They
nd that a common currency has a positive impact on FDI within the euro area.
They also nd that the impact of the euro on FDI is higher in the EU peripheral
5Bloningen (2005) o¤ers a good survey of literature on FDI determinants.
6Dixit (1989) models a rms entry and exit decisions under uncertainty theoretically, and
Carruth et al. (2000) provide a complete survey of empirical literature on exchange rate volatility
and FDI based on option theory.
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countries like Greece or Italy. When they drop these two countries from the sample,
the e¤ect of the euro on FDI decreases by 10 percentage points to 19 percent.
However, the question whether the euro has also attracted capital from the rest
of the world is not addressed. Petroulas (2007), using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach for a panel of unilateral FDI ows for 18 countries, also tackles this issue
as he explores changes in FDI ows within the euro area, between euro area countries
and non-euro area countries, and between non-euro area countries. He nds that
the introduction of the euro raised inward FDI ows by approximately 16 percent
within the euro area and by about 11 percent for non-member states. FDI ows
from the non-member countries into the euro area increased by 8 percent. On the
same note, Schiavo (2007) estimates the e¤ect of a common currency on bilateral
FDI ows among 25 OECD countries, by applying a gravity-type empirical model
with a parsimonious set of explanatory variables. He concludes that a reduction
in exchange rate uncertainty due to the introduction of the euro increases cross-
country investment ows by 160 to 320 percent. An alternative specication using
three-year averages in order to eliminate a high variability in FDI ows decreases
the magnitude to 70 to 250 percent. The endogeneity of FDI with respect to GDP
is partly resolved by the use of xed e¤ects. However, the wide range of the results
suggests that estimates should be interpreted with caution.
The majority of mentioned papers (De Sousa and Lochard, 2006; Petroulas, 2007;
Schiavo, 2007) use country-pair xed e¤ects, capturing time-invariant heterogeneity
between country pairs, thereby reducing concerns about the endogeneity of invest-
ment ows. However, this variation also includes time-invariant observable controls
(e.g. common language) and, consequently, precludes the quantication of their im-
pact separately. This poses a serious concern for the validity of the gravity model,
as the models intuition is built upon the incorporation of time-invariant factors like
land area and distance between countries.
Apart from examining FDI ows using the data from balance of payments, there
are studies inspecting plant-level micro data. Buch et al. (2003) analyze the impact
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of the euro on capital inow using German data from a mandatory rm-level survey
organized by the Bundesbank.7 They nd that FDI from the EU signicantly in-
creased after the introduction of the euro. The e¤ect is present to a smaller extent
also for non-euro countries. The advantage of Buch et al.s approach is the use of
reliable rm-level data as compared to general capital account FDI data. However,
they face the problem of using a single nations data and the uncertainty that the
results are driven by national asymmetric shocks. These suspicions are partly con-
rmed by Petroulas (2007) who nds that Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg act
as a hub for FDI ows of the euro area.8 Thus, the size of the impact of the euro
on FDI ows for individual countries seems to be ambiguous as Schiavo (2007), con-
trary to Petroulas (2007) and De Sousa and Lochard (2006), does not nd that any
country faces a higher impact of the euro on its FDI ows.
Summarizing, exchange rate uncertainty has received considerable interest in
the empirical literature on FDI in recent years. However, all papers work with
data ending by the year 2001 or 2002, and thus whether the euro has inuenced
rmslong-term investment decisions and their FDI location decisions still remains
mostly unanswered. Furthermore, since the common currency a¤ects international
investments via various channels, we might suspect that some of these channels
would need a longer period for transmission than two or three years after the common
currency is introduced. Therefore, our paper investigates the impact of the euro
using data on FDI ows until 2008. It allows us to examine the e¤ect of the common
currency on FDI in the longer term (nine years after EMU establishment) and to
shed light on foreign investorsmotivation by including countries from the latest
wave of euro area enlargement.
7In general, rm-level studies on FDI issues are not numerous due to unavailable or insu¢ cient
data.
8After excluding Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, most of the euro e¤ect disappears. On
the other hand, if they are excluded only as a receiver country or only as an investor country, the
euro e¤ect remains nearly the same.
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3.4 Methodology
We adopt the approach commonly used in the trade literature employing the gravity-
equation model which species trade ows between countries as a function of the
GDP of each country and the distance between these two countries.9 Recently, the
gravity-equation models have also proven to be useful in explaining international in-
vestment ows.10 The focus is put on time-invariant exogenous and policy variables
so that the endogeneity problem is eliminated. Explanatory variables such as geo-
graphic distance, cultural ties (common language) and policy changes are used. The
advantage is that panel data make it possible to analyze structural policy breaks.
In our paper, such an exogenous break is represented by the accession of a country
to the euro area.
The model thus combines institutional factors with environmental factors. The
traditional gravity literature (e.g. Brainard, 1997) species nancial ows between
countries as a function of various institutional and geographical factors. Following
this approach, the amount of FDI ow from a country i into a country j at time t
can be expressed as
lnFDIijt = (ln distij; lnGDPijt; lnULCijt; EERSRijt; EERLRijt;
borderij; langij; t; EUijt; euroijt); (3.1)
where FDIijt is FDI ow from a country i into a country j , dist represents the
geographical distance between countries, GDP stands for a product of countries
gross domestic products, ULC is a ratio of exchange rate adjusted unit labor costs,
EERSR stands for a short-term exchange rate volatility and is expressed as a two-
year coe¢ cient of variation of a ratio of countriesreal e¤ective exchange rate indices,
EERLR stands for a long-term exchange rate volatility and is expressed as a ve-
9Anderson (1979) presented a theoretical foundation for the gravity model. This approach has
been widely used to inspect trade ows between countries (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop, 2003).
Frankel and Wei (1996) rst applied the gravity equations on FDI ows.
10See Bergstrand and Egger (2007).
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year coe¢ cient of variation of a ratio of countriesreal e¤ective exchange rate indices,
border indicates a common border, lang is a dummy indicating countries share the
same language,11 EU is a dummy indicating presence of both countries in the EU
and euro is a dummy indicating that both countries belong in the euro area.
The semi-log functional form is chosen over the linear specication due to a better
t of the model. Given the skewness of FDI data, this specication more likely leads
to robust standard errors (Bloningen and Davies, 2004). Moreover, it reduces the
weight of outliers with very large FDI ows and it allows us to interpret the estimated
coe¢ cients of continuous variables as elasticities. However, this transformation is at
the expense of losing information from negative ows (this issue is addressed later).
The above-mentioned variables are traditional determinants of FDI ows, each
having its economic rationale.12 The size of the two economies measured as a product
of their GDP approximates the market potential of these countries. The empirical
literature nds that increasing size of two economies enhances FDI ows between
them. International price competitiveness expressed by unit labor costs a¤ects FDI
negatively. An improvement in ULC may occur via increases in labor productivity
or cuts in taxes, and the size of this e¤ect on FDI depends on the sensitivity of a
particular type of FDI. The sensitivity of FDI to a change in unit labor costs varies
across sectors; FDI demanding a highly-qualied labor force is not very sensitive,
while FDI demanding a low-qualied labor force is very sensitive to changes in unit
labor costs.13 The e¤ective exchange rate as a measure of whether a currency is
appreciating or depreciating to the exchange rate against a basket of foreign curren-
cies with whom the country trades enhances the e¤ect of the exchange rate and its
volatility on FDI ows. The literature supposes a negative relation between FDI and
exchange rate volatility as volatility increases macroeconomic uncertainty, thereby
11In case a country has more than one o¢ cial language, it is su¢ cient if any of these languages
is shared with the second country in a pair.
12Billington (1999) o¤ers summary of economic and political determinants of FDI. Chakrabarti
(2001) examines the impact of the whole set of variables on FDI and checks their robustness to small
changes in conditioning information set. Martín and Velázquez (1997) present FDI determinants
for OECD countries.
13Bellak et al. (2008) investigate the e¤ect of labor costs on FDI.
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reducing the attractiveness of domestic assets. We distinguish between a short-term
volatility of the exchange rate and long-term misalignments. The distance between
countries is another factor a¤ecting the FDI location mechanism. The empirical lit-
erature typically nds that it has a negative impact on FDI ows as greater distance
between countries makes a foreign a¢ liation more di¢ cult to establish, manage and
monitor.14 Following the same logic, the border dummy is expected to a¤ect FDI
ows positively as a common border represents smaller communication costs and
closer ties between countries. The e¤ect of the common language on FDI is also
expected to be positive as the common language decreases communication costs
for FDI ows. These three variables - geographical distance, border, and language
(often named as cultural distance) - are proxies for time-invariant asymmetries be-
tween countries which can strengthen the investment linkages between countries.
EU membership captures the overall benets of the single market on FDI ows and
is expected to be positive. Finally, the euro dummy is pivotal for our paper as it
expresses the e¤ect of the common currency on FDI.
3.5 Data
Annual FDI ow data during the period 1997-2008 are used for the analysis. The
availability of such a span presents an advantage over previously mentioned studies
on the FDI impact of the euro, which use only a limited number of years (one
to three) after the euros introduction. As the focus of this paper is the analysis
of European FDI ows, the main source of data on investment ows is Eurostat,
compiling harmonized FDI from regulatory reports to central banks and surveys
lled by resident business units.15 Eurostat provides data on unilateral FDI ows
for each reporting country by the partner country. Both FDI inows and outows
14Egger and Pfa¤ermayer (2001) analyze the e¤ect of distance on trade and FDI.
15FDI benchmark denition, according to the OECD, regards FDI as direct investment posi-
tions (equity and debt), direct investment income ows (distributed earnings, reinvested earnings,
interest income) and direct investment nancial ows (equity and debt) between the direct investor
and its direct investment enterprises abroad(OECD, 2008, page 17).
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are reported for 35 countries (29 OECD members and 6 non-OECD countries).16
The choice of countries is motivated by the e¤ort to cover FDI ows between the
majority of European countries and their major FDI partners. Overall, the data
sample consists of 589 country pairs, providing us with an unbalanced panel of
11,457 observations.17
One-way outward investment ows FDIijt are used, representing investment
from country i to country j in period t. It can occur that FDI ow from country i
to country j is measured in two di¤erent ways either reported by investing country
i as an outow to country j or reported by recipient country j as an inow from
country i. In reality, there is often a discrepancy between these two values. There
is no information indicating that either of these values is better, therefore, we
ameliorate this measurement error by constructing the average of the two series.
Table 3.4 displays the descriptive statistics of covariates for both euro and non-
euro country pairs.18 The majority of observations belongs to non-euro country pairs
(10,367 vs. 1,090 observations). With the exception of FDI ows, exchange rate
volatility, language and border dummy, observable characteristics for euro and non-
euro pairs are not very di¤erent. This is not surprising as most OECDmember states
are developed and quite homogeneous economies. More important, the similarity
suggests that the variance in FDI ows is not directly attributable to the level of
GDP or distance between countries.
Table 3.5 compares the trend of FDI for euro and non-euro pairs over time. It
16Out of a total of 34 OECD countries, Luxembourg, Israel, Chile, Mexico and Switzerland are
omitted. Unit labor cost data for Switzerland are not available. In the case of Luxembourg, balance
of payment data displays large FDI ows associated with the favourable bank environment which
is not a primary focus of this paper. Israel, Chile and Mexico exhibit a considerable number of
missing values on bilateral FDI ows. The six non-OECD countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Romania.
17Although the 35 considered countries constitute 35*34/2 = 595 country pairs, we do not
possess information for FDI ows between Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea (6
country pairs) for any year during 1997-2008. Out of 589 country pairs, there is information on
both FDI inow and outow during the whole period of 12 years for 191 country pairs; the rest
contain at least one missing value. However, we have at least 20 observations for 353 country pairs
and at least 10 observations for 567 country pairs.
18As stated above, a pair is viewed as a euro pairduring a given period if both countries use
the euro as a currency at this point in time. Otherwise (when one or both countries do not use
the euro), the pair is referred to as a non-euro pair.
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illustrates the U-shaped behavior of both groups of country pairs, with a modest
decline during 2000-2003, indicating that time trend is not a signicant factor in
explaining the di¤erence in FDI ows between euro vs. non-euro country pairs.
The source of unit labor cost data is the OECD and we construct the unit
labor cost ratio as a fraction of unit labor costs in an originating country over unit
labor costs in a recipient country. The source of data on GDP is the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the real e¤ective exchange rate indices (REER) are
obtained from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) database.19 A short-
term exchange rate volatility is expressed as a two-year coe¢ cient of variation of a
ratio of countriesreal e¤ective exchange rate indices, and a long-term exchange rate
volatility is expressed as a ve-year coe¢ cient of variation of a ratio of countriesreal
e¤ective exchange rate indices. Additional data include geographical and cultural
factors such as distance between countries, common border and language dummies.20
3.6 Econometric analysis
Empirical results of the euros impact on FDI have been less numerous than on
other issues concerning the impact of a common currency (e.g. trade e¤ect), mainly
due to a less developed empirical methodology and a lack of data (Baldwin et al.,
2008). A simple OLS estimation may be potentially biased due to the self-selection of
countries to adopt the euro. Therefore, after presenting OLS results, we address this
shortcoming by exploiting variation in FDI ows before and after the introduction of
the euro and by performing a Tobit estimation due to the left-censored character of
the dependent variable.21 Moreover, a pivotal aspect of our paper is that we account
for potential selection bias for euro adoption: the estimation is performed only
for a comparable subset of country pairs matched by a propensity score matching
19The BIS real e¤ective exchange rate indices are calculated as the geometric weighted average
of a countrys currency relative to an index of other major currencies adjusted for the e¤ects of
ination.
20Geographical distance between countries is measured as the distance between capital cities.
21Due to disinvestment, many FDI ows are negative, thereby precluding a conversion into a
logarithmic scale. These missing observations are considered as censored from the left.
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technique. Using this approach, the analysis is based on the comparison of otherwise
similar country pairs (identied by a similar propensity to share the euro), the only
di¤erence being the adoption of the euro.
3.6.1 Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation
A di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation allows us to exploit policy change and estimate
the impact of euro adoption on FDI ows. The following econometric specication
is estimated:
lnFDIijt = 1 ln distij + 2 lnGDPijt + 3ULCijt + 4EERSRijt + 5EERLRijt +
6borderij + 7langij + 8t+ 1EUijt + 2euroijt + ijt; (3.2)
where 1 and 2 are the coe¢ cients estimating the impact of the EU and the euro
on FDI ows, respectively.
However, because of the nature of the data, using simple OLS regression would
bias our estimates. Due to disinvestment, reported FDI ow is often zero or even
negative, which imposes a serious limitation when using a logarithmic form of the
dependent variable.22 In order to exploit the maximum amount of information from
the available dataset, data are modied in a way that observations with negative
FDI ows can also be used. One means of data modication is to perform a trans-
formation lnFDIijt  ln(x+ FDIijt), where x is a positive scalar (Gujarati, 1995).
However, in such a case, it would be di¢ cult to correctly interpret the parameter
estimates. An alternative transformation enables the adoption of the Tobit model
(Tobin, 1958), dening the dependent variable in the following way:
lnFDIijt  0 if FDIijt  0
lnFDIijt  ln(1 + FDIijt) if FDIijt > 0:
22Out of 11,457 observations, 1,908 report negative FDI ows.
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This specication of the dependent variable exhibits a left-censoring threshold at
zero. Tobit estimation controls for this feature of the data and yields consistent
parameter estimates.
3.6.2 Propensity scores matching
The propensity score matching technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) approxi-
mates a counterfactual outcome despite the lack of experimental data. It allows
us to match country pairs based on their observable characteristics and to compare
the potential outcomes between country pairs which share the euro with countries
that do not. In this way, we identify a control group of country pairs with a similar
propensity to share the euro but which actually do not share the euro.
Let FDI1ijt denote the value of FDI ow from country i to country j in the case
they both use the euro at time t and let FDI0ijt denote the level of FDI ows from
country i to country j in the case they do not share a common currency. The impact
of adopting the euro is then estimated as FDI1ijt   FDI0ijt:
The main problem in identifying the e¤ect of the euro on FDI ows is that FDI
is observed only for one scenario of the treatment variable (euroijt) and remains
unobserved for the other. One way to solve this problem is to use similar countries
selected by some matching mechanism and utilize this group as an approximate
counterfactual. This identication strategy assumes that the potential amount of
FDI between countries that adopted the euro would be the same as was the amount
of FDI for the control group that did not adopt the euro:
E(FDI0ijtjeuro = 1) = E(FDI0ijtjeuro = 0): (3.3)
However, it is di¢ cult to match country pairs based on many observable charac-
teristics. A more lucid way is to construct a one-dimensional metric as a matching
indicator. For this purpose, we employ a method uniting relevant observed char-
acteristics into a single score known as a propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
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1983). These propensity scores are obtained from the probit equation estimating
the probability of the event that a country pair shares the euro as a function of spec-
ied independent variables. After obtaining propensity scores, each treated pair is
matched to one or more control pairs (depending on the matching technique) and
the di¤erences in the outcome variable between matches serve as an estimate of the
euros impact on FDI ows.
The probability of receiving the treatment (sharing the euro) is estimated as
follows:
P (euroijt = 1) = (ln distij; lnGDPcapijt; ln areaij; langij; bordij; landlockij);
(3.4)
where P (euroijt = 1) stands for the probability that countries i and j both use
the euro at time t, explanatory variables are as in equation (3.1), augmented by
the number of landlocked countries in a country pair (landlock) and the product
of countriesarea and GDP per capita (areaij and GDPcap, respectively). This
unrestricted specication does not require matched observations to be from the
same year, matching a combination of a treated country pair/year to control coun-
try pair/year. In order to perform a robustness check, we estimate an alternative
specication of the probit equation:
P (euroij = 1) = (ln distij; lnGDPcapij; ln areaij; langij; bordij; landlockij); (3.5)
where P (euroij = 1) is the probability that countries i and j adopted the euro
between 1999-2008 and lnGDPcapij denotes the logarithm of GDPcap for 1998
(prior to euro adoption). This specication matches a treated country pair to a
control country pair. Including all observations for treated and control country
pairs in di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation (3.2) e¤ectively compares FDI ows from
the same year (heterogeneity across country pairs is controlled by xed e¤ects and
di¤erences between years is partly captured by the trend), thereby the specication
(3.5) will be referred to as restricted.
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It is crucial to stress that the objective of the probit equation is not to build a
statistical or even a political model explaining EMUmembership in the best possible
way. It is even possible that some relevant variables a¤ecting eurozone membership
are missing. Indeed, a close-to-perfect match would make matching more di¢ cult as
there would be only a few country-pair matches with a similar probability of sharing
the euro, the only di¤erence being the euro currency. The imperfect prediction of the
treatment does not present a problem as long as the omitted variables are unrelated
to other FDI determinants. The aim is not to obtain the best t for euro membership
in probit estimation, but to obtain a tool to identify and evaluate the impact of the
euros introduction.
A propensity matching setup requires the fulllment of some assumptions. First,
the potential amount of FDI in the case of not sharing the euro is equal for euro
and non-euro country pairs so that the latter group can serve as an adequate control
group (conditional independence assumption). This assumption is satised as the
explanatory variables in the FDI equation include a vast set of indicators a¤ecting
FDI ows such as distance between countries, variable for GDP measure, unit labor
cost ratio, exchange rate volatility, border and language dummies and time trend,
ltering out heterogeneity in FDI ows caused by observable characteristics. All
remaining di¤erences can be attributed to the common currency dummy. Second,
country pairs with similar values of the relevant covariates have a positive probability
of sharing and non-sharing the euro (common support assumption). In other words,
there should be no signicant di¤erence between the means of explanatory variables
in equation (3.4) for euro and non-euro country pairs. Based on the descriptive
statistics displayed in Table 3.4 this condition is assumed to be satised. Third,
FDI of a country pair sharing the euro is not a¤ected by another country-pairs
euro or non-euro state (stable unit treatment value assumption). Here, it can not
be assumed that there are no spillovers since a particular country pairs assignment
into the eurozone might be a¤ected by other country-pairsassignments.
Nevertheless, we can still draw some inference about the impact of the euro by
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redening the causal e¤ect: instead of measuring the e¤ect as the di¤erence between
what would have been observed in a world in which units received the treatment and
what would have been observed in a world where no treatment exists, we dene
the e¤ect as the di¤erence between the particular units observed outcome and
what would have been observed had that unit received no treatment. The average
of these estimated unit-level e¤ects gives us the demanded estimate of the average
e¤ect for the treated. Therefore, even in the absence of the stable unit treatment
value assumption, a well-dened causal question enables an attempt at analysis.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 The gravity model
Results for several baseline specications using the full sample of country pairs
are reported in Table 3.6. The rst specication is a simple OLS and the second
specication is a Tobit estimation which accounts for the left-censoring character
of the dependent variable. The third and fourth specications are augmented by
country-pair xed e¤ects, helping to control for unobserved heterogeneity among
various country pairs.
Before focusing on the relationship between a common currency and FDI ows,
we briey present the results for other explanatory variables. Results conrm the
idea behind a gravity model the product of countriesGDP has a positive and sig-
nicant impact on FDI ows, which indicates a link between the economic strength
of particular countries in a country pair and FDI ows. Geographical distance be-
tween two economies has a signicant negative e¤ect as expected. On the same
note, a common border and cultural proximity (measured by a common language)
both exhibit a positive and signicant e¤ect on FDI ows. These ndings conrm
the positive role of geographic factors in FDI allocation.
The unit labor cost variable indicates that the higher the relative labor costs
in the originating country, the higher the FDI ow in the recipient country, which
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is also in line with the theoretical proposition that investors seek a cheap labor
force. Finally, we nd a negative impact of exchange rate long term volatility, while
short-term volatility remains insignicant. These ndings reect the easier and less
expensive possibility of rms to insure against the risk of short-term volatility by
foreign exchange market instruments; long run exchange rate misalignments are
more costly and hardly avoidable, and thus have a deterrent e¤ect on FDI ows.
3.7.2 EU vs. euro impact
Further interpreting the results displayed in Table 3.6, the main contribution is
the segregation of the e¤ect of EU membership on FDI ows from that of EMU
membership. In a simple OLS specication, the impact of the euro is estimated to
be positive. However, in more appropriate specications accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity (xed e¤ects) or left-censoring (Tobit), this e¤ect becomes insigni-
cant. On the contrary, the magnitude of the EU dummy capturing the benets of
the common market remains signicant even with the inclusion of xed e¤ects. As
can be observed in the last column, EU membership increases bilateral FDI ows by
exp(0.732)-1 = 107.9 percent. On the other hand, the EMU impact is insignicant,
increasing FDI ows only by exp(0.138)-1 = 14.8 percent.23
The ndings from the baseline specications become even more robust by using
the propensity score matching technique. Elaborating the analysis, the Tobit esti-
mation is run for country pairs matched by propensity score matching. Table 3.7
reports the coe¢ cients for the EU and the euro variables. Under unrestricted match-
ing (linking a country pair in a particular year to other country pairs in other years),
the impact of belonging to the EU on FDI ows ranges from 54.5 to 71.9 percent.
In a restricted-matching specication (matching a treated country pair with control
country pairs and using this match for the whole period), this impact increases to
150.7 to 166.2 percent. On the contrary, the e¤ect of sharing the euro ranges around
23The interpretation of a dummy coe¢ cient  when the dependent variable is log-transformed
is given by  = 100*(exp()-1).
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zero (from -5.6 to 7.4 percent) and is clearly insignicant. The robustness of the
results is checked as di¤erent versions of matching techniques are used.24
The sign and signicance of other estimates are similar to those from baseline
specications. In particular, long-term exchange rate volatility reduces FDI between
countries, high gross domestic product in both the originating and target country
encourages FDI ows, while the distance between countries and the unit labor cost
gap decrease FDI ows.
Overall, the ndings suggest a limited impact of the common currency on FDI
ows. Being an EU member proves to be a far more crucial factor in boosting FDI.
However, it should be noted that euro adoption inherently reduces exchange rate
volatility. As a result, the coe¢ cient of the euro dummy in Table 3.7 captures the
part of the euro e¤ect on FDI not caused by a reduction of exchange rate volatility.25
3.7.3 Euro impact within the EU
In our dataset, all countries using the euro are members of the European Union.26
In order to extend our analysis, we investigate the impact of the common currency
solely for EU countries. It should be noted that the new sample does not contain
countries like the U.S., Canada or Australia, which should be taken into considera-
tion when interpreting the estimates.
Table 3.8 presents the e¤ect of the common currency on FDI ows within the
European Union. Under the Tobit specication, the euro dummy is signicant,
increasing bilateral FDI ows by exp(0.338)-1 = 40.2 percent. Table 3.9 shows more
precise estimates obtained on a subsample restricted by propensity score matching.
In case of EU countries, the euro increases bilateral FDI ows by 16.8 to 42.5
24We use following matching techniques: three nearest neighbours (NN3), Kernel matching, and
Radius matching.
25Indeed, excluding short-term and long-term exchange rate volatility variables from the model
slightly increases the euro impact; however, it remains statistically insignicant. For the sake of
brevity, these results are not reported.
26Strictly speaking, it is possible for a country to use the euro without being an EU member.
There are formal agreements between the European Central Bank (ECB) and Vatican City, San
Marino and Monaco, specifying use of the euro as a legal tender. In addition, Montenegro and
Andorra and Monaco use the euro without formal approval from the ECB.
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percent in the unrestricted specication and by 14.3 to 36.5 percent in the restricted
specication. Overall, this nding suggests that the common currency positively
a¤ects FDI ows within a group of relatively integrated markets. These results
should be viewed in the context of the hypothesis of endogeneity (Rose, 1999),
which assumes that stronger economic linkages among the members of a currency
union lead to the creation of an optimal currency union ex post (Frankel and Rose,
1998). Thus, the ndings of a positive e¤ect of the euro on FDI ows might also
indicate the creation of closer linkages between countries.
3.7.4 Time dimension of the euro e¤ect on FDI ows
Results on the link between the common currency and FDI ows are somewhat
contradictory to the existing literature on the FDI e¤ect of the euro, as most of the
existing literature nds a positive and signicant e¤ect (Petroulas, 2007; Schiavo,
2007). We test the hypothesis that this ambiguity may be caused by a short time
span used in these studies by exploring the time dimension of the euros impact on
FDI. We perform the analysis separately on the shortened period 1997-2003 which
corresponds roughly to the time span used in the previously mentioned studies.
Table 3.10 o¤ers a comparison of restricted-specication estimates for the initial
period (1997-2003) and the full time span (1997-2008). Results reveal that the euros
impact is more pronounced in the rst years after the launch of the euro (ranging
from 23.7 to 54.1 percent), becoming negligible only in the longer run. It should be
recognized that the euro dummy covers a di¤erent set of country pairs for di¤erent
years as new countries adopted the euro as the o¢ cial currency.
The ndings indicate a positive initial impact of the euro on FDI. However, this
e¤ect is only temporary and vanishes over subsequent years. A possible explanation
for this might be a saturation of investors inclined to locate in the euro area. Ar-
guably, it can be concluded that the impact of a common currency union is present
in the form of one-o¤ capital reallocation of multinational companies, reverting to
pre-euro levels in the longer run.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the impact of the euro on international FDI ows.
Analyzing bilateral FDI ows between 35 developed countries during 1997-2008, we
estimate the di¤erence in FDI ows for country pairs sharing the euro and country
pairs with at leastone country using another currency. The identication strategy
is based on propensity score matching, ensuring that the control group of country
pairs is similar in terms of the probability to share the euro.
The ndings indicate that the impact of the euro on FDI ows is negligible (-
5.6 to 7.4 percent). Interestingly, being in the EU contributes much more to FDI
ows than does the common currency, increasing FDI ows by 54.5 to 166.2 percent
(depending on the matching specication).
The e¤ect of the euro on FDI ows, however, di¤ers for the sample of OECD
countries and for the subsample of EU countries. In the former case it does not
signicantly increase FDI ows, while in latter case it accelerates FDI ows by 14.3
to 42.5 percent.
The results suggest that the impact of the euro on FDI ows is smaller than
suggested in the recent literature. One reason of this discrepancy may be the use
of a more elaborated econometric technique (propensity score matching). Another
reason may be longer time span used in this thesis, which captures the latest wave
of EMU enlargement between 2006-2008. Indeed, shorter time span of three years
used in previous studies exhibits a positive e¤ect of the euro on FDI also in our
setup. Nevertheless, considering the high variability of FDI ows, the estimate of
the impact should be interpreted with caution. EU membership, being a more
dominant factor in FDI attraction than the euro, also contributes to a weakening
The reason may be the use of a di¤erent econometric technique and longer time
span, capturing also the latest wave of EMU enlargement between 2006-2008. The
time span of roughly three years, used in previous studies, should be interpreted with
caution, considering the high variability of FDI ows. In addition, the EU member-
ship is a stronger factor than the euro in a¤ecting FDI ows, which contributes to
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a weakening role of the euro in boosting FDI over time.
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3.10 Appendix
Table 3.1: A timeline of the euro area enlargement
EMU membership 1997-98 1999-2000 2001-06 2007 2008 2009-10 2011
Austria x x x x x x
Belgium x x x x x x
Cyprus x x x
Estonia x
Finland x x x x x x
France x x x x x x
Germany x x x x x x
Greece x x x x x
Ireland x x x x x x
Italy x x x x x x
Luxembourg x x x x x x
Malta x x x
Netherlands x x x x x x
Portugal x x x x x x
Slovakia x x
Slovenia x x x x
Spain x x x x x x
Note: Sign xindicates EMU membership during a particular period of time.
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Table 3.2: World FDI ows by recipient country
FDI ows World Developing Transition Developed EU EMU
year bil. USD (at current prices) % % % % %
1980 54 14 0 86 39 -
1990 208 17 0 83 47 -
2000 1382 19 1 81 49 36
2001 825 26 1 73 47 35
2002 628 28 2 70 49 39
2003 566 33 4 82 46 39
2004 733 40 4 56 29 17
2005 986 34 3 63 51 27
2006 1459 30 4 67 40 23
2007 2100 27 5 69 43 28
2008 1771 37 7 57 30 17
Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
Note: According to the UN classication, countries are divided into the following groups: developed
economies, developing economies, and transition economies. The development of a country is
measured with the Human Development Index (HDI), a compound indicator of the following
indexes: income per capita, life expectancy, and the literacy rate.
Table 3.3: Annual FDI ows to developed economies
FDI ows Europe America Asia Oceania Developed Total
mil. USD (current prices)
1995 137 68 2 16 222
1997 155 115 5 10 285
1999 532 308 16 3 851
2001 395 187 8 11 601
2003 280 61 10 12 362
2004 218 136 11 45 410
2005 509 131 8 -23 625
2006 628 297 9 36 970
2007 988 375 31 49 1,444
2008 551 380 35 52 1,018
2009 378 149 16 23 566
Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
Note: North America is represented here by the United States, Bermuda, Canada, Greenland,
Saint Pierre and Miquelon.
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Table 3.4: Averages of descriptive statistics for euro/non-euro country pairs
(1997-2008)
euroij = 1 euroij = 0
log(FDIij) 4.49 2.77
log(GDPi GDPj) 39.19 37.62
log(distance) 7.14 7.84
ULC ratio 1.00 1.02
EER short 0.11 0.44
EER long 0.03 0.07
common border 0.18 0.06
common language 0.09 0.05
landlocked 0.18 0.24
# observations 1,090 10,367
Note: Dummy euroij equals 1 if both countries in a pair use the euro; otherwise it equals 0.
FDIij stands for FDI ows from country i to country j in mil. USD, GDP is a gross domestic
product per capita in USD (deated to year 2000), ULC ratio is a ratio of exchange rate adjusted
unit labor costs in country i compared to country j, EER short is a two-year coe¢ cient of variation
of a ratio of countriesreal e¤ective exchange rate indices, EER long is a ve-year coe¢ cient of
variation of a ratio of countriesreal e¤ective exchange rate indices, landlocked takes values 0, 1
or 2 according to the number of landlocked countries in a country pair.
Table 3.5: Average log(FDI) for euro vs. non-euro country pairs, by year
year euroij = 1 (# obs.) euroij = 0 (# obs.)
1997 2.50 679
1998 2.61 711
1999 4.83 78 2.37 708
2000 5.30 78 2.25 793
2001 4.70 98 1.02 892
2002 4.11 109 1.89 948
2003 4.17 110 1.87 989
2004 4.18 110 2.09 1026
2005 4.46 110 2.18 1047
2006 4.74 110 2.46 1060
2007 4.72 132 2.75 918
2008 4.03 155 2.82 596
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Table 3.7: The impact of the EU and the euro on FDI inow: matching
Model PSM algorithm NN3 Kernel Radius
EU Euro EU Euro EU Euro
Unrestricted coef 0.435 0.014 0.508 -0.016 0.542 -0.013
std (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13)
% impact 54.5 1.4 66.2 -1.2 71.9 -1.3
Restricted coef 0.979 0.028 0.924 0.022 0.919 -0.098
std (0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.21)
% impact 166.2 2.5 152.1 7.4 150.7 -5.6
Note: The table contains results of the Tobit estimation on the dataset containing treated country
pairs with control country pairs identied by propensity score matching: NN3 - nearest three
neighbors, kernel matching, radius matching. The dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI ow
from originating to recipient country. The impact on FDI ows in percentages is calculated as
100*(exp(coef)-1). Unrestricted specication performs matching of country pair/year to a country
pair/year, i.e., allows di¤erent control country pairs for di¤erent years. Restricted specication
matches a country pair with a di¤erent country pair (based on observables from 1998 prior to
euro adoption) and uses this match for the whole period 1997-2008. Standard errors in parentheses.
Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %, * 10%.
Table 3.8: Baseline results: Euro impact on FDI ows for EU countries
OLS Tobit FE(3) Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(GDPi GDPj) 0.627 (0.019) 0.786 (0.026) 0.821 (0.487) 0.285 (0.195)
log(distance) -0.855 (0.085) -1.091 (0.116)
ULC ratio 0.243 (0.353) 0.280 (0.480) 0.178 (0.367) 0.396 (0.416)
EER short 1.294 (2.899) 3.100 (3.933) -1.528 (2.685) -0.832 (3.698)
EER long -1.652 (1.745) -2.231 (2.391) 1.113 (2.314) 1.324 (3.107)
Euro 0.215 (0.102) 0.264 (0.138) 0.227 (0.149) 0.338 (0.205)
common border 0.343 (0.164) 0.302 (0.219)
common language 1.178 (0.183) 1.273 (0.245)
Country-pair dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 3,966 3,966 3,966 3,966
1,141 censor. 1,141 censor.
R-2 adj. 0.356 pseudo 0.083 overall 0.301 pseudo 0.147
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI ow from originating to recipient country.
Time and country-pair dummies are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance
levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %, * 10%.
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Table 3.9: The impact of the euro on FDI inow for EMU countries: matching
Model Matching algorithm NN3 Kernel Radius
Euro Euro Euro
Unrestricted coef 0.354 0.155 0.238
std (0.18) (0.15) (0.14)
% impact 42.5 16.8 26.9
Restricted coef 0.311 0.134 0.234
std (0.17) (0.15) (0.20)
% impact 36.5 14.3 26.4
Note: The table contains results of the Tobit estimation on the dataset containing a sample of EU
countries during 1997-2008. The dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI ow from originating
to recipient country. Alternative PSM algorithms are used: NN3 - nearest three neighbors, kernel
matching, radius matching. The impact of the euro on FDI ows in percentages is calculated as
100*(exp(coef)-1). Unrestricted specication performs matching of country pair/year to a country
pair/year, i.e., allows di¤erent control country pairs for di¤erent years. Restricted specication
matches a country pair with a di¤erent country pair (based on observables from 1998 prior to
euro adoption) and uses this match for the whole period 1997-2008. Standard errors in parentheses.
Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %, * 10%.
Table 3.10: The impact of the euro on FDI inow: by time period
Model PSM algorithm NN3 Kernel Radius
1997-2003 coef 0.280 0.213 0.432
std (0.24) (0.20) (0.26)
% impact 32.3 23.7 54.1
1997-2008 coef 0.024 0.071 -0.058
std (0.17) (0.15) (0.21)
% impact 2.5 7.4 -5.6
Note: The table contains results of the Tobit estimation with the logarithm of FDI ow from
originating to recipient country as a dependent variable. Alternative PSM algorithms are used:
NN3 - nearest three neighbors, kernel matching, radius matching. The impact of the euro on FDI
ows in percentages is calculated as 100*(exp(coef)-1). The specication matches a country pair
with a di¤erent country pair (based on observables from 1998 prior to euro adoption) and uses
this match for the whole period. Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5
%, * 10%.
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